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ABSTRACT

DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES IN REASONING ABOUT CROSS-CLASSIFIED
INDIVIDUALS
Catherine H. McDermott
April 19, 2019
Social categories allow children to make inferences about novel situations, which
can then guide their interactions with others. However, this process can be complicated
because individuals often belong to many different, sometimes interrelated, social
categories. Four experiments examine whether children and adults differ in their
willingness to classify a person as holding two social roles (e.g., a mother and a
daughter), and how this influences their reasoning. Specifically, this work will examine
the influence of cross-classification on inductive inferences, trust in testimony, and
knowledge evaluations. The aim of these experiments is to investigate whether children
privilege certain roles when reasoning about individuals who hold multiple social roles.
Because children rely heavily on their knowledge of individuals’ social roles to interact
with them appropriately, it is important that children be able to accurately use these social
categories to reason about others. Experiments 1 and 2 explore children’s willingness to
cross-classify individuals into a variety of social roles with varying degrees of
hierarchical (vs. non-hierarchical) structure. Experiment 2 further examines what
cognitive mechanisms may underlie children’s cross-classification behaviors.
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Experiments 3 and 4 examine how children make inferences about and evaluate the
testimony of cross-classified individuals. Overall, the findings of these four experiments
illustrate that there are developmental differences in willingness to cross-classify and
reasoning about cross-classified individuals occurring between the preschool, early
elementary, and adult years. The results of these experiments suggest that crossclassification may influence the way children make inferences about individuals, but that
cross-classification does not influence their trust in the testimony of individuals with
multiple social roles. This work contributes to our growing understanding of how
children utilize information about social categories to reason about others.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Children are constantly receiving novel information from their environment and
having to make sense of it. One of the ways that children organize this information is
through categorization (Markman, 1989). Categorization refers to the process of
organizing the environment into cohesive groups of entities, thus allowing these entities
to be treated equivalently (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Categories give
structure to the environment (Murphy, 2002), allow individuals to reason beyond only the
information that is available (Smith & Medin, 1981), and support inferences about both
novel situations and individuals (Rhodes, 2013). Because adults have more general
knowledge and experience than children, children’s concepts differ from those of adults
(Carey, 1985). However, categories are ubiquitous across ages (Murphy, 2002), and
although children do not display the same broadly defined categories as adults (Rosch,
1973), they do indeed have fairly complex conceptual abilities (Murphy, 2002).
Categorical Organization
Categories can be organized in various ways, at different organizational and
structural levels. From a young age, children recognize different kinds of categories. By
age three, children are able to make use of script and taxonomic categories (Nguyen &
Murphy, 2003). Script categories refer to items that go together in the same sort of event
or activity (e.g., pumpkins and costumes on Halloween), whereas taxonomic categories

1

include items with shared or common attributes (e.g., birds can fly; Lucariello, Kyratzis,
& Nelson, 1992). Children are also able to categorize the same entity into both
taxonomic and script categories, suggesting that they can use more than one form of
categorization (e.g., Nguyen & Murphy, 2003). Knowing what kind of category an item
belongs to is essential to being able to make accurate judgments about a given category
and its members (Murphy, 2002). Categories can also be organized hierarchically at the
subordinate, basic, and superordinate levels. Basic level categories are often the first
categories children develop, share the most common features, and have the highest cue
validity (i.e., denote the highest likelihood that a cue is associated with a category; Rosch
& Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976). Categories can also be organized at the
superordinate, or broadest level of abstraction, and the subordinate, or most specific level
of abstraction (Mervis & Crisafi, 1982).
Blewitt (1994) proposed that children’s understanding of category hierarchies
progresses through four levels, beginning in the preschool years. Level one, which
begins around age two, represents a stage during which children do not have any real
knowledge of category hierarchies, whereas at level two children have some implicit
understanding of hierarchies. In level two, which develops between ages two and four,
children may accept that an item can belong to multiple categories, although they are
often unable to reason any further about these multiply classified items. Upon reaching
levels three and four, children are able to use their knowledge about the relationship
between categories to make both quantitative and qualitative inferences. Indeed, children
as young as two have been found to form different hierarchical categories and classify the
same objects within different categories (Blewitt, 1994).
2

Social Categorization
The study of concepts and categories has historically focused on labeling entities
and objects, however there is another area of study that has only recently been given as
much attention. In recent years, research on how children label and subsequently reason
about people in different domains and across various social categories has grown.
Similar to categorizing objects, children use group labels to split up individuals into
different social categories (Macnamara, 1982). Indeed, research has suggested that even
infants are able to pick up on information related to social categorization (Shutts,
Pemberton, & Spelke, 2013). In order to interact with and navigate their environments
successfully, children must be able to determine not only what social group various
individuals belong to, but also what membership in a social group implies or
communicates about the characteristics or behaviors of group members. Relatedly,
children must recognize that the degree to which group members may be similar or
dissimilar differs based on the social category in question (Baron, Dunham, Banaji, &
Carey, 2014).
Two prominent theories of how children develop and use social categories have
been proposed. The first is that social categories are kind referring (Rothbart & Taylor,
1992), and that the category that an individual fits into reflects some internal aspects of
that individual which cause its external and observable characteristics and behaviors (e.g.,
a tiger’s DNA causes it look and act like a tiger). This theory posits that children believe
social categories denote group membership that is stable over time and predictive of a
variety of behaviors. A second, more recent theory is that social categories are markers
of social obligations (Rhodes, 2013), in that they are used to understand individuals’
3

interactions and relations to one another. In support of this theory, studies have found
that from age three children use social categories to predict social interactions (Rhodes,
2012). Given these two theories, much of the research investigating children’s
development of and reasoning about social categories has focused on exploring whether
children treat social certain categories as naturally or artificially constructed, and
investigating how children use categories to determine how they should interact with
others.
One difficulty that children have when categorizing new information is that they
often see categories as more homogenous (Rhodes & Brickman, 2010) and permanent
(Diesendruck, Goldfein, Rhodes, Gelman, & Neumark, 2013; Gelman & Wellman, 1991)
than they may be. Rhodes and Brickman (2010) found that children often fail to
recognize that there can be within-category variance, unless the diversity of a sample has
been emphasized or made salient. Although adults recognize diverse samples as more
representative of a category, children often do not, which can prevent them from
understanding the benefits of making inferences based on diverse rather than
homogenous samples. Specific to social categorization, children often face the challenge
of both recognizing and understanding the different social roles that a person may hold.
Because the roles people hold are often nonobvious (Gelman & Wellman, 1991) and
cannot be recognized by simple observation of perceptual properties (Gelman &
Markman, 1986), social categorization may be difficult for children.
Work in this area suggests that there are developmental and cultural differences in
the way children reason about and represent different social categories. In terms of
recognizing different social groups, preschoolers can identify various types of people
4

(Kalish & Lawson, 2008), and distinct social categories, including race (e.g., Roberts &
Gelman, 2016) and gender (e.g., Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Race and gender represent a
unique area of study because these categories are often marked by salient physical and
social markers that other categories may not have. Rhodes and Gelman (2009) found that
younger children (5- and 7-year-olds) typically viewed gender as a naturally constructed
category (i.e., categories of objects that occur in nature). In contrast, 10-year-old children
viewed gender as more artificially constructed (i.e., categories of objects that are created
by humans). Compared to gender, younger children viewed race as more artificially
constructed, whereas older children viewed race as naturally constructed. Further, some
of the differences in children’s reasoning were attributable to their cultural context (e.g.,
children from rural areas often view race as more naturally constructed than children
from urban areas; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Researchers have also investigated how
people reason about multiracial individuals, or individuals who belong to more than one
race, and found that both children and adults exhibit more difficulty when performing
categorization tasks about multiracial versus monoracial individuals (Roberts & Gelman,
2015). Both younger and older White children (4- to 13-years-old) were more likely to
categorize an individual as ‘Black’ when their race was ambiguous (or multiracial).
Roberts and Gelman (2015) claim that this effect may be a product of overweighing
minority perceptual features. Interestingly, this study found no developmental
differences in perception, indicating that race is a salient enough cue for even young
children to use when making categorization judgments. Unlike adults, preschoolers’
reasoning about social categories has been suggested to be primarily based on their
observations of perceptual features (Watson, 1984). However, in contrast to social
5

categories with distinct visual or physical features, many social categories are defined by
factors such as occupation, familial role, age, and hobbies.
Although learning to recognize different social categories is an important aspect
of social cognitive development, one of the critical functions of social categories is that
they denote certain expectations for the members of that social group (Kalish & Lawson,
2008). For example, the social category of ‘teacher’ allows for certain behavioral (writes
on a chalkboard), psychological (is smart), and deontic (can tell you what is allowed in
class) predictions. These defined group behaviors often exist in relation to another role,
for example the expected behaviors of a student are defined in reference to the expected
behaviors of a teacher. Social groups defined by role-based properties have been shown
to be particularly salient for children (Kalish & Lawson, 2008). Kalish and Lawson gave
children the opportunity to categorize individuals following information about their
deontic and psychological properties. They found that both younger and older children
viewed deontic (or obligation-related) properties as most central to category membership,
with younger children showing the most reliable judgments of this sort, suggesting that
children may be less perceptually biased than previously suspected. By four years old,
children are also able to use information about an individual’s social category to make
inferences about shared biological and psychological properties (Shutts et al., 2013).
Diesendruck and Eldror (2011) have also found that children are able to use biological
and psychological properties to infer category membership, and that children are more
concerned with category members sharing the same psychological (rather than biological)
properties. Importantly, social categorization also allows children to predict how another
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person may behave and what that person may be obligated or not allowed to do (Kalish &
Lawson, 2008).
Studying social categories is important because people often treat these categories
as if they are inherent, permanent, and predictive of individuals’ characteristics
(Diesendruck & Eldror, 2011). Understanding social categorization is a necessary step
in knowing how to effectively interact with and behave towards others, as well as a
foundation of children’s developing social competence (Watson, 1984). As adults, we
understand that individuals can simultaneously belong to a multitude of social categories;
however, the fact that children’s representations are still developing may present an
obstacle for their understanding that an individual can be a member of various social
categories at the same time.
Children’s Cross-classification Behaviors
While children readily classify new information into existing categories, one
obstacle they may face is classifying entities into multiple categories. Crossclassification is the ability to categorize one item into multiple categories (Murphy &
Ross, 1999), a necessary skill as almost every individual is a member of multiple social
categories (Murphy & Ross, 1999; Nguyen & Chevalier, 2015; Ross & Murphy, 1999).
The ability to cross-classify is not only important to social interactions, but also
represents children’s developing cognitive flexibility (Nguyen, 2007). Given that most
people belong to multiple categories, children need to be able to flexibility shift their
reasoning to attend to the appropriate role at the appropriate time in order to effectively
interact with others.
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Extending work by Ross and Murphy (1999) demonstrating that adults crossclassify foods into multiple categories, Nguyen and Murphy (2003) examined whether 4year-old children, 7-year-old children, and adults would perform cross-classification
within the food domain when presented with taxonomic and script categories.
Participants in Nguyen and Murphy’s (2003) third experiment were given the opportunity
to categorize an item in both a taxonomic and script category on two independent trials.
While all age groups showed cross-classification levels that were significantly above
chance, 7-year-old children and adults did so significantly more often than 4-year-old
children, suggesting that cross-classification abilities improve through the early
elementary years.
Nguyen (2007) examined the development of children’s cross-classification
behaviors within taxonomic and script categories across multiple experiments. In the
first experiment, children were given the opportunity to categorize items into both
taxonomic and script categories on different trials. Overall, children ages 3-, 4-, and 6years-old all cross-classified at levels above chance (i.e., were willing to classify the
same item as belonging to both a script and a taxonomic category), and this behavior
increased over these age groups with 6-year-old children showing no significant
differences from adult-like responding. In a second study using largely the same
procedure, 2-year-old children also cross-classified items (although they did this at levels
only just above chance) and showed no significant differences in responding from the 3year-old children in the first experiment. In a third experiment, participants were asked if
items could simultaneously belong to both a taxonomic and script category (e.g., “Are
pajamas bedtime clothes?”). Participants in all age groups endorsed cross-classified
8

labels at similar rates when these labels were appropriate (e.g., pajamas are bedtime
clothing, but a library is not a bedtime building). However, when cross-classified
category labels were inappropriate, 3-year-old children’s performance was significantly
worse than the other age groups. Additionally, 4-year-old children’s performance on the
inappropriate classification items did not differ from chance. Taken together, these
studies indicate that children as young as two are able to able to cross-classify items as
belonging to both taxonomic and script categories, and by age four children exhibit some
ability to represent these classifications simultaneously. Overall, research examining
children’s cross-classification performance suggests that children have some rudimentary
ability to reason that objects can simultaneously belong to multiple categories and that in
certain cases two hierarchically related labels may apply to the same item (Blewitt,
1994).
The Present Studies
Cross-classification is a necessary step in accurately reasoning about the social
role intersections present when an individual holds more than one role at the same time
(Watson, 1984). Despite the fact that performing cross-classification and navigating the
multiple social roles held by others is an important and ubiquitous experience, relatively
little research has focused on exploring the emergence and development of young
children’s cross-classification behaviors in the social domain. Because children rely
heavily on their knowledge of social categories to interact with others appropriately, it is
important that they develop a mature understanding of these categories (Kalish &
Lawson, 2008; Rhodes & Brickman, 2010). The current set of experiments will
contribute to our growing understanding of how children use information about the social
9

roles that individuals hold to make inferences, evaluate testimony, and infer knowledge
status.
We are particularly interested in how children reason about individuals in familial
and occupational roles, given the hierarchical nature of these social roles and the
literature indicating that children exhibit differences in reasoning in these domains at
different ages (e.g., Deak & Maratsos, 1998; Jordan, 1980). These experiments answer
two questions: 1) How does children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals develop,
and 2) how does cross-classification influence children’s reasoning in different domains?
Experiments 1 and 2 will explore children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals into
a variety of social roles with varying degrees of hierarchical (vs. non-hierarchical)
structure. Experiment 2 will further examine whether children’s willingness to crossclassify individuals in hierarchical social roles can be improved through a brief training
and whether certain cognitive competencies contribute to children’s cross-classification
behaviors. Experiments 3 and 4 will examine how children reason about individuals who
are cross-classified. Specifically, we will be examining how cross-classification
influences children’s inductive inferences, trust in testimony, and knowledge evaluations,
and whether there are developmental differences in reasoning in these domains from the
preschool to early elementary years.
Finally, this work will provide insight into how children’s reasoning about
individuals may be influenced by cross-classification. Investigating whether children
believe others can hold multiple social roles and whether this varies by domain, is
important to understanding how children may believe they should behave in relation to
others. For instance, if a child believes that a woman can be only a mother or a daughter,
10

but not both, this could have implications for how that child thinks they should interact
with her. This work will also have implications for how adults explain or talk to children
about the social roles that other’s hold. In certain contexts, it may be important to make
holding multiple social roles salient to children (e.g., being a teacher and a cook may
indicate a wider knowledge base). However, in other contexts, it may be beneficial for
children to be focused on a single social role (e.g., if the role of student undermines the
role of teacher). Understanding children’s beliefs about whether individuals can hold
multiple social roles and how this cross-classification influences children’s reasoning
about and interactions with others will expand our growing understanding of children’s
social cognition.
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT 1 – CHILDREN’S WILLINGNESS TO CROSS-CLASSIFY
INDIVIDUALS
Introduction
As adults we understand that people often hold many different social roles at the
same time. For instance, a woman can simultaneously be a mother, daughter, teacher,
student, voter, and athlete. This kind of social categorization is particularly relevant
because expectations about social roles are important in guiding children’s inferences
(Kalish & Lawson, 2008) and interactions (Watson, 1984). For the purpose of the current
experiment, “social roles” refer to labels that reference identities that provide meaningful
information about individuals, and that refer to rich social categories. For example, the
label “mother” is informative along many dimensions. Further, understanding the social
roles that an individual holds provides information about how that person may behave,
including what that person may be obligated or allowed to do (Kalish & Lawson, 2008;
Watson, 1984). Understanding the many social roles held by individuals is important to
being able to appropriately and effectively interact with others.
Attributing multiple social roles to a single individual may be a challenging task
for young children. In general, children may exhibit a tendency to seek out the one – and
only – label for an entity. Classically, Piaget (1928) demonstrated that children typically
resist the notion that an entity can have multiple labels. As highlighted in the literature
12

on the mutual exclusivity bias (see Woodward & Markman, 1991, but also see Deak &
Maratsos, 1998; Mervis, Golinkoff, & Bertrand, 1994), this tendency may be adaptive in
some situations (e.g., word learning), but it may interfere with children’s ability to
perform cross-classification. Further, it has been suggested that even older children and
adults will default to a mutual exclusivity type bias when integrating new and old names
for a given referent (Merriman & Bowman, 1989). Although some studies have indicated
that children as young as two years old are willing to generate more than one term to
refer to a single entity (Clark & Svaib, 1997), it is unclear if they will do so when the
terms in question are social roles.
Dahlgren (1985) suggested that individual social categories are represented in a
similar manner to other entities (e.g., animals, food, etc.). However, it is unclear whether
children treat social categories as if they are exclusive (e.g., a student cannot also be a
teacher) or inclusive (e.g., a mother can also be a daughter). Thus, the current experiment
aims to answer two questions: a) does children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals
change over the course of development, and b) does the structure of the social roles being
probed influence children’s cross-classification behaviors? In order to explore these
questions in a systematic manner, we elected to probe children’s intuitions about crossclassification by presenting them with pairs of social roles that were more or less
structured and asking children to determine whether an individual could hold both roles.
In the current experiment we generally investigated children’s willingness to
attribute two social roles to a single individual. If children apply the same governing
principles that they apply to basic level labels to social roles, then they may treat them as
mutually exclusive. Alternatively, children may learn to suspend the mutual exclusivity
13

bias over the course of development. Critically, some social roles are more related, or
structured, than others. Thus, it is possible that children may treat some social roles as
more exclusive than others.
In order to manipulate structure, we presented children with social roles that
varied on that dimension. Our highly structured stimuli included two kinds of social
roles with hierarchical structure, including familial (e.g., mother-daughter), and
occupational (e.g., teacher-student) dominant-subordinate pairs of social roles. These
hierarchically structured roles were contrasted with non-hierarchical occupations (e.g.,
cook-runner). Thus, contrast allowed us to determine whether children treat social roles
as exclusive because they are basic level labels, or if children treat them in this manner
because they are meaningfully structured. One weakness of this design is that children
may reasonably infer that all of these social role labels are non-exclusive and doing so
may set up a response pattern wherein children simply affirm every item. In order to
prevent such a task demand from unduly influencing participants’ responses, we also
presented children with other labels that were not social roles, including items involving
relative social (e.g., nice-mean) and biological (e.g., tall-short) evaluations. If children
do tend to cross-classify, then these items will help us to understand whether the nature of
the judgment (social versus biological) or the contrast between the labels (relative in this
case, rather than absolute) influences children’s willingness to cross-classify. Finally, in
order to ensure that the children were paying attention to the task, we included check
items that children should have been unwilling to cross-classify, as they included basic
level labels that they should have treated as exclusive (e.g., person-giraffe). This array of
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dimensions allowed us to determine when children were willing to attribute multiple roles
to the same individual, and to identify what variables were relevant to their intuitions.
Methods
Participants
Participants in this experiment included a group of younger children, older
children, and adults, recruited from urban and suburban areas in and around Louisville,
KY. These age groups were selected to represent different levels of cognitive
development and formal schooling experience (Carey, 1985; Gelman, 1988). Thirtythree 3- to 5-year-old children (Mage = 4.80, SD = .813, females = 16), 30 6- to 8-year-old
children (Mage = 7.65, SD = .920, females = 13), and 35 adults participated in this
experiment. None of the children who participated in Experiment 1 participated in any of
the subsequent experiments. Adults were included in this experiment to represent
“mature” reasoning about these concepts. Note that, as a requirement of the IRB
approval of this experiment, adult demographic information was not collected. Eightyfour percent of the children in this experiment were Caucasian, 3% were Asian, 2% were
African American, and 2% were mixed race (parents of the remaining 9% did not provide
a response). An additional 20 3- to 5-year-olds were interviewed, but their data were
excluded from analyses for failing to respond correctly to two or more of the check items.
Of the participants that were excluded, 35% were age three (N = 7), 30% were age four
(N = 6), and 35% were age five (N = 7). All participants included in data analyses passed
two or more of the check items. We had no initial estimates of effect size to use in
estimating appropriate sample sizes for this experiment. Thus, we elected to recruit
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moderately large samples for each age group. Post-hoc power analyses revealed that our
method was sufficiently powerful to detect significant effects with a sample size of only
18 participants per group. Thus, we concluded that the above sample sizes were
appropriate.
Materials
The materials for this experiment included 24 images of adults (half female and
half male) with neutral facial expressions from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll,
& Wittenbrink, 2015). The images included faces of Asian, Caucasian, AfricanAmerican, and ambiguous origin. Participants were shown an image of a face on a
laptop, using presentation software. Images were accompanied by a statement and
follow-up question.
This cross-classification query included 24 questions made up of 12 different
pairs of social roles (see Table 1 and Appendix A). Pairs of social roles were divided into
six different categories, two with hierarchical structure (e.g., familial hierarchical,
occupation hierarchical), one with no hierarchical structure (e.g., occupation nonhierarchical), two relative pairs (e.g., social relative, biological relative), and one set of
check questions to make sure participants were not simply answering ‘yes’ to every
question.
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Table 1
Pairs of social roles presented (Experiment 1)
Category
Familial Hierarchical
Occupation Hierarchical
Occupation Non-hierarchical
Social Relative
Biological Relative
Check

Pairs
Mom – Daughter; Dad – Son
Teacher – Student; Doctor – Patient
Cook – Runner; Artist – Swimmer
Rich – Poor; Mean – Nice
Tall – Short; Weak – Strong
Person – Dolphin; Person – Giraffe

Adult judgments. To ensure that the pairs of social roles we presented had the
structure we intended, we collected preliminary data from an additional 20 adult
participants to examine how ‘associated’ they believed the roles in question to be. In
addition to the pairs of social roles presented in Table 1, we included four check items
probing unrelated social roles (e.g., daughter-cook). These pairs of social roles were
randomly selected across the social categories.
Participants judged how associated they believed two social roles to be on a 7point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all associated) to 7 (extremely associated). We
utilized one-sample t-tests to compare mean scores of each item category to the midpoint
(midpoint = 3.5; see Figure 1). We found that within the familial hierarchical, occupation
hierarchical, biological relative, and social relative item categories, associative judgments
were all significantly above chance, p’s < .001. In contrast, the associative judgments of
the occupation non-hierarchical, check items (animal), and unrelated check items (social
roles) were all significantly below chance, p’s < .001. Thus, we concluded that the pairs
we presented to participants were representative of social roles with varying structure.
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Figure 1. Mean associative ratings by Item Category.

Procedure
The experimenter and the child sat side-by side with a laptop between them. For
each test item, the experimenter gave the participant a brief description followed by a
question about the specific image presented on the screen. For example, “This person is
a daughter. Can this person also be a mom?” The participants then answered with either
“yes” or “no.” Items were presented in one of two pseudo-random orders, in that no item
category had a run of more than two pairs. Each pair of social roles was presented twice
so that each role appeared first (e.g., “This person is a teacher. Can this person also be a
student?” and “This person is a student. Can this person also be a teacher?”).
Participants were either tested in a quiet space at their school or in a university research
lab. Each testing session lasted approximately ten minutes.
Results
For each trial, participants were scored a 1 for responding that an individual could
hold both social roles and a 0 for saying they could not, resulting in a total composite
score that could range from 0-4 for each of the five item categories (check items were
used as an inclusion criterion, but were not analyzed).
Preliminary analyses revealed no main effects of order or gender at any age,
therefore we collapsed subsequent analyses across these factors. We used a repeated
measures ANOVA with Age Group (younger children, older children, and adults) as a
between-subjects factor and Item Category (familial hierarchical, occupation hierarchical,
occupation non-hierarchical, social relative, and biological relative) as a within-subjects
factor. Because the assumption of sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates
19

are reported where appropriate. Our analysis revealed a significant main effect of Age
Group, F(2, 95) = 16.69, p < .001, p2 = .26, and a significant main effect of Item
Category, F(3.30, 313.20) = 18.05, p < .001, p2 =.16, embedded within a significant
interaction between Age Group and Item Category, F(6.59, 313.20) = 7.31, p < .001, p2
=.13.
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests revealed that younger children showed no
differences in responding between any of the item categories. In contrast, older children
cross-classified occupation non-hierarchical items significantly more often than familial
hierarchical, occupation hierarchical, and biological relative items, ps < .001. Adults
cross-classified occupation non-hierarchical items significantly more often than social
relative items, p < .05, and they cross-classified biological relative items at a significantly
lower rate than all four of the other item categories, ps < .05.
Within the familial hierarchical category, both younger children (M = 2.21, SD =
1.69) and older children (M = 2.87, SD = 1.48) had significantly lower scores than adults
(M = 3.97, SD = .17), p < .01 (see Figure 2). Within the occupation hierarchical
category, younger children (M = 1.97, SD = 1.78) had significantly lower scores than
both older children (M = 2.93, SD = 1.17) and adults (M = 3.89, SD = .40), p < .01, and
older children also had significantly lower scores than adults, p < .01. Within the
occupation non-hierarchical, category younger children (M = 2.36, SD = 1.85) had
significantly lower scores than both older children (M = 3.83, SD = .59) and adults (M =
4.00, SD = .00), p < .01. Within the social relative category, younger children (M = 1.88,
SD = 1.60) had significantly lower scores than both older children (M = 3.33, SD = 1.09)
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and adults (M = 3.40, SD = .85), p < .001. Within the biological relative category, there
were no differences between younger children (M = 2.18, SD = 1.74), older children (M =
2.53, SD = 1.38), and adults (M = 2.66, SD = 1.21).
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Figure 2. Mean number of cross-classifications for each Item Category by Age Group.

Discussion
The goal of this experiment was to examine developmental differences in
willingness to cross-classify individuals into multiple social roles, and whether this
willingness was influenced by the structure of the category in question. This experiment
was intended to gather a baseline for children’s cross-classification behaviors as they
pertained to the social roles that an individual may hold. Although previous research has
suggested that children are more willing to cross-classify items over the course of
development (Nguyen, 2007), they may struggle more broadly with allowing one entity
to have multiple labels (Woodward & Markman, 1991), especially at the same basic
level. Although studies have investigated both children’s cross-classification behaviors
(e.g., Nguyen, 2007; 2012; Nguyen & Chevalier, 2015; Nguyen & Murphy, 2003) and
their social categorization in general (e.g., Diesendruck & Eldror, 2011; Kalish &
Lawson, 2008; Rhodes, 2013), none have directly investigated children’s willingness to
cross-classify individuals into more than one social role across various social categories.
Thus, we believe this to be one of the first studies to specifically investigate children’s
willingness to cross-classify individuals into multiple social roles at the basic level, and
to examine how their willingness to cross-classify individuals varies given the structure
of the social roles in question (e.g., hierarchical vs. non-hierarchical).
The first aim of this experiment was to determine whether willingness to
cross-classify individuals changes over the course of development. The results revealed
that overall younger children cross-classified individuals significantly less often than
older children and adults in the majority of the categories being probed (with the
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exception of the biological relative category). The older participants in this experiment
represented a midpoint between the younger children and adults in that they showed adult-like
reasoning in some domains (e.g., occupation non-hierarchical, social relative, biological
relative), but not others (e.g., familial hierarchical, occupation hierarchical), suggesting that
children become more willing to cross-classify individuals into multiple social roles over the
course of development.
The second aim of this experiment was to determine whether the structure of the
social role in question influences cross-classification behaviors. Younger children crossclassified at similarly random rates across all of the item categories, suggesting that they
may be treating these roles as mutually exclusive, regardless of their structure. Older
children were willing to attribute two roles to a single person when the roles in question
were unstructured, but when the roles were structured hierarchically, older children were
less willing to attribute both to the same person. Because older children were willing to
cross-classify non-hierarchical social roles, they appear to be using the structure of the
roles, rather than mutual exclusivity alone, to determine whether an individual may hold
both roles simultaneously. This interpretation is supported by children’s responses to the
social relative items as well. These judgments were less straightforward, as indicated by
adult performance being below ceiling, but the reported pattern of results suggests that
young children treated social relative labels as being more exclusive (i.e., you can’t be
rich and poor at the same time) than older children and adults, who treated them as less
exclusive, perhaps alluding to a better understanding of the relative nature of judgments
of variables such as wealth. Finally, we hesitate to further interpret responses to the
biological relative judgments. We intended them to represent an opportunity for our
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participants to generate “no” responses other than on check items, but adults and children
were more mixed in their responses than we anticipated.
There are a few possible explanations for children’s reluctance to cross-classify
individuals into multiple social roles. The first, and most straightforward explanation is
that children broadly have difficulty with cross-classification; however, this does not
completely explain the reluctance that children exhibited in the current experiment.
Given that older children showed adult-like cross-classification in some categories but
not in others, specifically those with hierarchical structure, it is possible that these
differences may reflect the development of cognitive processes, such as executive
function or cognitive flexibility. There may also be more domain-specific differences
that account for some of the results seen in the current experiment. For example, children
may have difficulties understanding the present-future continuity of some of these roles
(Jordan, 1980). Although previous studies have investigated present-future continuity in
terms of kinship roles specifically, the occupation hierarchical roles in the current
experiment have a similar structure in that these roles may represent a present-future
transformation (e.g., student-teacher), but can also be held simultaneously. Our findings
suggest that although younger children exhibit the lowest levels of cross-classification
behaviors in general, children are still developing the ability to cross-classify individuals
into roles with hierarchical structure through the early school years.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although the current experiment establishes a baseline for children’s crossclassification behaviors in terms of social roles, it is unclear what underlies the
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developmental differences that were observed. It is possible that there are developmental
differences in general cognitive abilities (e.g., cognitive flexibility, non-verbal reasoning,
executive functioning) that could account for some of the differences in children’s crossclassification behaviors. Future studies should include measures of cognitive abilities as
a possible mechanism for explaining developmental differences in reasoning about the
cross-classification of individuals.
In future work, it will also be important to investigate how children use the
information about a given individual’s social roles to reason within other domains. One
area of interest is how children make inferences about cross-classified individuals.
Previous research has indicated that when making inductive inferences, children may rely
more on social categories than other available information (Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006;
Heyman & Gelman, 1998; Nguyen, 2012). However, based on children’s reluctance to
cross-classify individuals into hierarchical roles in the current experiment, it could be the
case that when making inferences about cross-classified individuals, children defer to one
role instead of accounting for all of an individual’s social roles. Exploring how social
roles contribute to children’s reasoning about others’ testimony is another area of
considerable importance. Children’s lack of direct access to information (Harris, 2012)
results in much of their knowledge being acquired through information received from
others (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). Research has suggested that individuals may rely on
group membership to make inferences about informants by extending information about a
social category to all of its members (Landrum, Eaves, & Shafto, 2015). In future work,
it will be crucial to determine how children’s reasoning about cross-classified individuals
influences their reasoning in other domains of social cognition.
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Conclusions
Understanding how children reason about the social roles that others hold is
an important step in more broadly understanding children’s social cognitive
development (Watson, 1984). When children do not, or cannot, account for the
multiple social roles that individuals hold, this can limit their interactions to be in
relation to one selected social role rather than a given individual’s full identity. It is
also important that we, as adults, understand where children may be lacking in their
overall understanding of social categorization.
Based on these preliminary findings, the subsequent studies reported here will
focus on social roles that have a hierarchical structure, specifically familial and
occupational roles. Focusing on these social roles will allow us to determine how these
difficulties in cross-classification impact children’s reasoning about individuals in
various domains, and specifically how children make inferences, evaluate testimony, and
make judgments about expertise.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 2 – TEACHING CHILDREN TO CROSS-CLASSIFY INDIVIDUALS
Introduction
In Experiment 1, young children exhibited a general reluctance to classify
individuals as simultaneously holding two social roles, and older children showed this
same pattern of responding for social roles that had a hierarchical structure. However, it
is unknown why children exhibited this reluctance to cross-classify individuals. Given
that previous research has demonstrated that young children are able to cross-classify
entities outside of a social role domain (Nguyen, 2007; Nguyen & Murphy, 2003), it
seems unlikely that children’s reluctance in Experiment 1 came from a broader difficulty
with cross-classification tasks. Similarly, the breadth of work indicating that children
will accept multiple labels for a referent at young ages (Clark & Svaib, 1997; Deak &
Maratsos, 1998; Waxman & Hatch, 1992), suggests that it is unlikely that children’s
reluctance was due primarily to a mutual exclusivity bias. Thus, it is possible that there is
a more general cognitive limitation, such as cognitive load, contributing to children’s
reluctance to classify individuals as simultaneously holding multiple social roles.
Cognitive load theory suggests that learning and performance are hindered when
processing demands are too high (Mayer & Moreno, 2003). According to cognitive load
theory, when children are learning or dealing with new information, their working
memory capacity is limited and their performance often degrades (Paas, Renkl, &
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Sweller, 2004). Various strategies have been proposed to improve performance by
decreasing cognitive load, including receiving training prior to learning (Mayer &
Moreno, 2003) and practicing new skills (Paas et al., 2004). In Experiment 1, it could
have been the case that children did not have the processing capabilities to
simultaneously hold multiple representations for the same individual (Flavell et al.,
1986). Mayer and Moreno (2003) suggest that when there are limitations on cognitive
load caused by representational complexity, presenting some sort of animation paired
with narration can reduce the need to hold multiple representations in memory.
Similarly, scaffolding, or assisting a child with elements of a task that exceed their
learning capacity can improve their performance on tasks that may otherwise be too
difficult for them (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976).
Thus, in Experiment 2, we investigated whether reducing children’s cognitive
load would lead to an increased willingness to cross-classify individuals. In order to
lighten children’s cognitive load, we presented them with scaffolding in the form of a
short narrative explaining the hierarchical family structure accompanied by a ‘family
tree’ schematic. If children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals is influenced by
their cognitive load, then this intervention should increase children’s rates of crossclassification. If the intervention does lead to any increase in children’s rates of crossclassification, this could indicate that the willingness to perform cross-classification is not
limited by children’s cognitive competencies, but perhaps by the maturity of their
conceptual representations. It could also be the case that children tested in Experiment 1
were more reluctant to cross-classify individuals, because they were not familiar with the
occupational hierarchical social roles we probed. To explore this explanation, we
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included a matching task in Experiment 2, designed to ensure that children were familiar
with the social roles we presented.
In addition to examining whether cross-classification behaviors can be increased
by reducing cognitive load, we also explored two cognitive competencies as possible
explanations for any developmental differences we may find in Experiment 2. Based on
the systematic differences that emerged in children’s cross-classification behaviors in
Experiment 1, it is possible that there were improvements in specific cognitive
competencies that may have predicted these differences in responding. One possibility is
that developmental differences in cognitive flexibility predict children’s crossclassification behaviors. Cognitive flexibility, or the ability to categorize the same item
differently based on specific contexts (Ionescu, 2012), develops over the course of
childhood. It may be that children’s willingness to classify an individual as
simultaneously holding multiple social roles depends on their ability to flexibly switch
their cognitive representation of that individual (e.g., from daughter to mom). It could
also be that general relational or non-verbal reasoning explains some of the variance in
children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals. Relational reasoning, or the ability to
find meaningful relationships between entities (Jablansky, Alexander, Dumas, &
Compton, 2015), develops throughout childhood and is fundamental to later abstract
thought (Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996; Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006). Although
young children have some ability to perform relational reasoning, this skill improves over
the early and later elementary school years (Jablansky et al., 2015). Given that there are
improvements in cognitive flexibility and nonverbal reasoning that occur in early
childhood, we included measures of these two cognitive competencies to examine
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whether or not they predict children’s cross-classification behaviors. In the current
experiment, children will be presented with the same cross-classification task that was
used in Experiment 1, however this task will be preceded by a training task designed to
provide children with scaffolding for performing cross-classification. The central task of
Experiment 2 differs from Experiment 1 in that only familial hierarchical, occupation
hierarchical, and occupation non-hierarchical items were presented. Following the crossclassification task, children completed the Dimensional Change Card Sort - border
version (DCCS; Zelazo, 2006) as a measure of cognitive flexibility and the KBIT-2 Nonverbal Reasoning Subscale (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).
Methods
Participants
Based on an a priori power analysis using effect sizes from Experiment 1, we
determined that a sample size of 18 children per age group would be sufficient to detect
significant effects. Age groups in this experiment and all subsequent experiments will be
narrower than those in Experiment 1 for a few reasons. First, the large number of threeyear-old children that failed to pass the check questions in Experiment 1, led us to believe
that tasks of this nature may be too difficult for this age group. Second, there seemed to
be a shift between preschool and school-aged children in the understanding of kinship
terms (Watson, 1984), for this reason we did not be include six-year-old children, as they
may represent a transition in kinship understanding. Thus, participants in this experiment
included a group of younger children and older children, recruited from urban and
suburban areas in and around Louisville, KY. Eighteen 4- to 5-year-old children (Mage =
5.02, SD = .66, females = 9) and 17 7- to 8-year-old children (Mage = 7.91, SD = .59,
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females = 9) participated in this experiment. None of the children who participated in
Experiment 2 participated in any of the subsequent experiments. Seventy-four percent of
the children in this experiment were Caucasian, 9% were African American, 3% were
Asian, and 11% were mixed race (parents of the remaining 3% did not provide a
response). An additional 2 children were interviewed, but their data were excluded from
analyses due to experimenter error in the administration of the KBIT-2.
Materials
The training materials for this experiment included a ‘family tree’ schematic. The
family tree was presented on plain white 8.5 x 11 in. paper in black and white ink and
depicted 3 generations of family members (see Figure 3). The ‘family tree’ schematic
was gender matched so that male participants saw and heard about a family tree including
three generations of males, and female participants saw and heard about three generations
of females.
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Figure 3. Example of ‘family tree’ schematic shown to participants in Experiment 2.
Family members were shown as line drawings to control for any perceptual features that
children may have been relying on to make their judgments. The cross-classification
items were identical to those used in Experiment 1 and were similarly presented. The
cross-classification items for this experiment included 6 different pairs of social roles (see
Table 2) divided into three different categories: two with hierarchical structure (e.g.,
family hierarchical, occupation hierarchical) and one without such structure (e.g.,
occupation non-hierarchical).
Table 2
Pairs of social roles presented (Experiment 2)
Category
Familial Hierarchical
Occupation Hierarchical
Occupation Non-hierarchical

Pairs
Mom – Daughter; Dad – Son
Teacher – Student; Doctor – Patient
Cook – Runner; Artist – Swimmer
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Participants also completed a matching task where they were instructed to identify
4 images of different social roles (teacher, student, doctor, patient) from an array of 5
photos. For each item, participants were asked to point to a certain social role (ex: “Can
you point to the teacher;” see Figure 5 for example of stimuli). A fifth social role (chef)
was included as a lure to ensure that children’s correct identifications were not simply a
product of eliminating all other response options. After the matching task, cognitive
flexibility was measured using the Dimensional Change Card Sort – border version (Frye,
Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Zelazo, 2006). Non-verbal reasoning abilities were measured
using the KBIT-2 Non-verbal reasoning subsection (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). See
Appendix B for example protocol (excluding KBIT-2 section).
Procedure
To begin the experiment, the experimenter introduced the child to the family tree.
The experimenter started at the bottom of the family tree and gave the following
instructions: “First, I want to tell you about this picture. This person is her/his
daughter/son. This person is her/his mom/dad. She/he is also this person’s daughter/son.
This person is her/his mom/dad.” As the narrative progressed, the experimenter indicated
the individuals they were referencing, so that children were able to keep track of which
referent the experimenter was talking about. After this training, participants completed
the cross-classification task as in Experiment 1. Following the cross-classification task,
participants completed a matching task in which they were instructed to identify images
of four different social roles (e.g., “Can you point to the picture of a teacher?”).
Participants then completed the DCCS – border version, followed by the KBIT-2 Nonverbal reasoning subsection.
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Results
Matching Task
To ensure that children were familiar with the social roles that we presented, we
included a matching task where participants were instructed to identify the four
occupation hierarchical social roles included in this experiment. For the matching task,
participants were scored a 1 for responses that correctly matched a given social role label
with the appropriate image, and a 0 for incorrect responses.
We used one-sample t-tests to compare participants responding on each matching
task item to chance (chance = 20%). Younger children correctly identified the student (M
= .83, SD = .38), teacher (M = .89, SD = .23), patient (M = .56, SD = .51), and doctor (M
= .89, SD = .32) at levels significantly above chance, p’s < .01. Older children correctly
identified the all social roles on 100% of the trials, so t-tests were not calculated.
Social Role Cross-Classification Data
For each cross-classification trial, participants were scored a 1 for responding that
an individual could hold both social roles and a 0 for saying they could not, resulting in a
total composite cross-classification score that could range from 0-4 for each of the three
item categories. Preliminary analyses revealed no main effects of order or gender,
therefore we did not include these factors in subsequent analyses. We used a repeated
measures ANOVA with Age Group (younger children and older children) as a betweensubjects factor and Item Category (familial hierarchical, occupation hierarchical, and
occupation non-hierarchical) as a within-subjects factor. Our analysis revealed no
significant main effect of Age Group, F(1, 33) = .02, p = .888, p2 = .001, or Item
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Category, F(2, 66) = 1.75, p = .182, p2 =.05. However, there was a significant
interaction between Age Group and Item Category, F(2, 66) = 5.02, p < .05, p2 =.13.
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed that younger children showed no
differences in responses between the occupation hierarchical items (M = 3.17, SD =
1.38), occupation non-hierarchical items (M = 2.94, SD = 1.39), and familial hierarchical
items (M = 3.00, SD = 1.60; see Figure 4). In contrast, older children cross-classified
occupation non-hierarchical items (M = 3.29, SD = 1.36) and familial hierarchical items
(M = 3.18, SD = 1.13) significantly more often than occupation hierarchical items (M =
2.47, SD = .94), p’s < .05.
We also conducted one-sample t-tests to compare children’s scores in each item
category to chance (chance = 2). Younger children’s scores were significantly greater
than chance on the occupation hierarchical, t(17) = 3.58, p < .01, occupation nonhierarchical, t(17) = 2.88, p < .01, and familial hierarchical items, t(17) = 2.64, p < .05.
Older children’s scores were also significantly greater than chance on the occupation
hierarchical, t(16) = 2.06, p = .05, occupation non-hierarchical, t(16) = 3.93, p = .001, and
familial hierarchical items, t(16) = 4.29, p = .001.
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Figure 4. Mean number of cross-classifications for each Item Category by Age Group.

Relationship between Cognitive Competencies and Social Role Cross-Classification
There was a positive correlation between children’s age and their DCCS score, r =
.52, p < .01, as should be expected given children’s increasing cognitive flexibility over
the preschool and early elementary years (see Table 3). Using multiple regression, we
tested a model that assumed all three of our variables of interest – age (in years),
cognitive flexibility (DCCS), and non-verbal reasoning (KBIT-2) – predict children’s
overall performance on cross-classification trials. Note that the Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF) and Tolerance values for this model indicated that multicollinearity was not a
problem for interpreting these data. This “full” model did not produce a significant
regression equation, R2 = .03, F(3, 31) = .30, p = .83 (see Table 4). Further, none of our
variables of interest contributed significantly to the model. Note that a larger sample size
may have increased our ability to detect significant relationships between variables.
However, the reported model does not approach significance and a feature of our
manipulation is that it reduced variability. Thus, we concluded that these factors did not
meaningfully predict variability in children’s cross-classification behaviors.
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Comparison of Results across Experiments 1 and 2
To more directly examine the effects that the scaffolding in Experiment 2 had on
children’s cross-classification behaviors, we compared children’s scores on the crossclassification task across Experiments 1 and 2. We used a repeated measures ANOVA
with Age Group (younger children and older children) and Experiment (Experiment 1
and Experiment 2) as between-subjects factors and Item Category (familial hierarchical,
occupation hierarchical, and occupation non-hierarchical) as a within-subjects factor.
Because the assumption of sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates are
reported where appropriate. Our analysis revealed no significant main effect of
Experiment, F(1, 94) = 1.29, p = .26, a marginally significant main effect of Age Group,
F(1, 94) = 3.12, p = .08, p2 = .05, and a significant main effect of Item Category,
F(1.832, 172.230) = 8.90, p < .001, p2 = .09. Significant interactions between Age
Group and Item Category, F(1.832, 172.230) = 6.00, p < .01, p2 =.06, and Age Group
and Experiment, F(1, 94) = 3.89, p = .05, p2 = .04, were also detected, all embedded
within a significant three-way interaction between Item Category, Age Group, and
Experiment, F(1.832, 172.230) = 3.40, p < .05, p2 =.04 (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Mean number of cross-classifications for each Item Category by Age Group and Experiment.

Bonferroni-corrected planned comparisons comparing each age group’s
performance between experiments revealed that there were no significant differences in
older children’s responding across item categories in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
However, younger children had significantly higher scores on the occupation hierarchical
items in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, p < .01, d = .75. Younger children’s scores
on the familial hierarchical items were also trending towards being significantly higher in
Experiment 2 than Experiment 1, p = .08, d = .61. Younger children’s scores on the
occupation non-hierarchical items did not differ between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
Discussion
Social role cross-classification. The first goal of this experiment was to
determine whether a training session aimed at reducing cognitive load by highlighting
hierarchical family structure would influence children’s willingness to cross-classify
individuals in social roles with such structure. Overall, there were no significant
differences in younger and older children’s willingness to classify individuals as holding
multiple social roles. However, for the older children in this experiment, there were
differences in responding based on the structure of the social role in question. Older
children cross-classified occupation non-hierarchical and familial hierarchical items
significantly more often than occupation hierarchical items. When participants were
provided with this scaffolding, there were no longer differences between age groups (as
seen in Experiment 1) and responding in both age groups was above chance for all items.
Taken together, the results of the cross-classification task in this experiment
suggest that the scaffolding that the family tree schematic and training provided may
have reduced the cognitive load on children, thus increasing their cross-classifications in
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the familial hierarchical category. Although the younger children seemed to show
domain general increases in cross-classification behaviors (i.e., their cross-classifications
did not differ across item types), the training seemed to provide only domain specific
improvements for the older children. For the older children, scaffolding increased crossclassification rates for the familial hierarchical items to be similar to the rates for the
occupational non-hierarchical items. However, this was not the case for the occupation
hierarchical items, indicating that this training did not extend to hierarchical relationships
in general.
Relationship between cognitive competencies and social role crossclassification. The second aim of this experiment was to examine the relationship
between children’s cognitive competencies and their cross-classification behaviors in a
social domain. The results indicate that neither cognitive flexibility nor non-verbal
reasoning predicted children’s cross-classification behaviors in a social domain.
Although the results also suggest that age, cognitive flexibility, and non-verbal reasoning
did not predict cross-classification behaviors, we believe these results should be
interpreted cautiously. Because we attempted to scaffold children in this experiment to
perform cross-classifications at higher rates, it could be the case that our manipulation
removed some of the individual differences in cross-classification behaviors between age
groups. The results of the current study suggest that holding multiple representations in
their heads may decrease children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals.
Cross-experiment comparison. To more directly examine the effect that the
scaffolding in Experiment 2 had on children’s cross-classification behaviors, we
compared cross-classification data between Experiments 1 and 2. Note that this
44

comparison is somewhat imperfect due to the differences between the two experiments;
however, for exploratory purposes we believe this analysis to be particularly valuable.
Our results indicated that older children’s scores were not affected by the scaffolding in
Experiment 2, but younger children’s scores were affected. The younger children crossclassified individuals in the occupation hierarchical category significantly more often in
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, suggesting that the scaffolding provided offset some
of the children’s cognitive load limitations and led to an increase in the crossclassifications made for these items. Although the scaffolding children received was in a
familial domain, on the familial hierarchical items, younger children were only trending
towards cross-classifying significantly more often in Experiment 2 versus Experiment 1.
It could be that case that since younger children already had a higher number of crossclassifications on the familial hierarchical as compared to the occupation hierarchical
items in Experiment 1, there was less room for them to improve in Experiment 2. Given
that there were no differences in older children’s cross-classification rates between
Experiments 1 and 2 and that responses were significantly higher than chance rates across
item categories in Experiment 2, it seems that older children’s willingness to crossclassify individuals was not limited by cognitive load. However, cross-experiment
comparisons suggest that younger children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals
may be increased by providing them with scaffolding that offsets some of the
representational work they would otherwise have to do from memory.
Limitations and Future Directions
In this experiment, we were interested in how reducing cognitive load would
influence children’s subsequent cross-classification behaviors. We were also interested
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in whether cognitive flexibility and nonverbal reasoning abilities predicted children’s
willingness to classify individuals as holding multiple social roles. A general limitation
of this experiment is that since we provided a training aimed at increasing children’s
cross-classification scores, we may have inadvertently eliminated some of the natural
variance in these behaviors. So, although we found no relationship between the cognitive
competencies we tested and children’s willingness to classify individuals as holding
multiple social roles, it is possible that this relationship exists when children are not given
training prior to completing this cross-classification task. In future studies, it will be
important to test these cognitive competencies without any sort of training in order to
gather a baseline for how these underlying mechanisms may relate to children’s more
naturalistic cross-classification behaviors.
In our exploration of possible cognitive competencies that may predict children’s
cross-classification behaviors, we chose to include cognitive flexibility and non-verbal
reasoning as measures of individual differences. Although neither of these cognitive
competencies predicted children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals, there could
be other mechanisms at play that predict children’s cross-classification behaviors. In
future studies, it will be important to examine additional cognitive competencies (e.g.,
theory of mind, inhibitory control, executive function), to better understand what
cognitive mechanisms may underlie children’s development of adult-like crossclassification behaviors.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT 3 – CHILDREN’S INFERENCES ABOUT CROSS-CLASSIFIED
INDIVIDUALS
Introduction
Categorization allows people to divide the world into meaningful units and is
essential to making sense of the environment. Induction allows people to use category
information to make educated guesses about new or unfamiliar entities (Markman, 1989;
Rips, 1975). Inductive inferences rely on the use of known categories and allow an
individual to hypothesize beyond the information that is currently available (Gelman,
1988). For example, if children know that birds can fly, they may assume that a new,
unfamiliar bird they encounter would be able to do the same (Gelman & Markman,
1986). Children are able to use categories to make inferences (Gelman & Markman,
1986) and have shown some ability to cross-classify entities (e.g., Nguyen, 2007; 2012;
Nguyen & Murphy, 2003). However, when making inferences about items that belong to
multiple categories, they face the added obstacle of deciding which category they should
employ to make these inferences. Category-based induction allows individuals to make
inferences about unfamiliar situations (Gelman, 1988), including what to expect and how
to behave in different social situations (Rhodes, 2013). Induction serves critical functions
in development, both in guiding social interactions (Nguyen & Chevalier, 2015), and in
reasoning about others (Shutts et al., 2013).
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Although adults understand that people and objects belong to many different
categories, when reasoning about individuals who are members of multiple social
categories, adults often use only one of the known categories to make inferences about
that individual. Studies have suggested that in order to simplify thinking, adults often
focus on the most ‘distinctive’ social role held by an individual when making inferences
(e.g., ‘skydiver’ may be more distinctive than ‘tennis player;’ Macrae, Bodenhausen, &
Milne, 1995; Nelson & Miller, 1995). Although some studies have shown that adults will
consider multiple categories when making inferences about cross-classified entities, this
seems only to be the case when the context of the questions they are being asked refers to
both categories (Murphy & Ross, 1999). Indeed, without such context, adults tend to use
inductive selectivity, and base their inferences off one category, rather than taking all
category memberships into account. Inductive selectivity refers to the ability to make
inferences using individual category memberships of cross-classified entities (Nguyen &
Girgis, 2014).
In a study examining children’s induction regarding cross-classified entities,
Nguyen and Murphy (2003) investigated children’s use of taxonomic, script, and
evaluative categories when making inferences in a food domain. In their fourth
experiment, they explored what categories 4-year-olds, 7-year-olds, and adults used when
making biochemical (e.g., chemical make-up of food) versus situational (e.g., what
setting food is eaten in) inferences. They found that while adults exhibited inductive
selectivity, using taxonomic and evaluative categories to make biochemical inferences
and script categories to make situational inferences, children made similar numbers of
biochemical and situational inferences across all three category types. In a follow-up
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experiment examining only taxonomic and script categories, 7-year-old children
exhibited the adult-like inductive selectivity demonstrated in the previous experiment.
Although 4-year-olds showed significant differences in their use of taxonomic categories
to make biochemical inferences and script categories to make situational inferences, they
did not use taxonomic categories to make biochemical inferences at levels above chance,
indicating that their use of inductive selectivity is still developing. Although children as
young as age four have been found to make some use of inductive selectivity when
making inferences, this skill is still developing over the early elementary years (Kalish &
Gelman, 1992; Nguyen, 2012; Nguyen & Murphy, 2003).
Social categorization may be particularly important for induction, because the
ability to organize individuals into different social categories, or distinct social groups
(Diesendruck & Eldror, 2011), allows individuals to make inferences about novel
situations and to predict outcomes (Rhodes, 2013). Previous research suggested that
when reasoning about social categories, children focus on physical and behavioral
properties (Aboud, 1984; Watson, 1984). Kalish and Lawson (2008) asked participants
to make category membership judgments based on either frequency (e.g., how often
someone does something), psychological (e.g., what someone likes to do), or deontic
(e.g., what someone must do) information. They found that younger children (4- to 5years-old), older children (7- to 8-years-old), and adults used deontic properties most
often when making social categorizations in non-personality categories, with younger
children showing the most reliable use of deontic properties. However, older children
also relied on deontic properties to make categorizations in personality categories (or
those with central psychological properties).
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In a follow-up experiment, Kalish and Lawson (2008) examined whether
participants would make inferences about behaviors based on deontic or psychological
properties, and found that younger children, older children, and adults viewed deontic
properties as the most reliable information to use when making inferences about
behavior. In a third experiment, Kalish and Lawson (2008) investigated whether
participants believed individuals who had the same deontic properties or preferences
would be members of the same social categories. Similar to their first two experiments,
they found that young children saw deontic properties as more reliable than preferences
when making inferences about category membership. However, older children showed
more mixed responding, inferring category membership similarly from deontic properties
and preferences. In contrast to previous claims (Aboud, 1984; Watson; 1984), the results
from this set of studies suggest that young children make use of deontic properties when
reasoning about category membership.
Understanding the social roles that a given person may hold is a necessary
prerequisite to interacting appropriately with, and accurately anticipating the behavior of,
others (Rhodes & Gelman, 2008). However, it may be difficult for children to make
inferences about individuals who hold multiple social roles (i.e., cross-classified
individuals), because they need to mentally represent two roles simultaneously. Further,
Experiments 1 and 2 of the current set of studies indicated that children may have
difficulty reasoning about cross-classified individuals when they hold roles that are
embedded within a hierarchical social role. Because children rely heavily on
categorization to understand and respond appropriately to an individual’s roles (Rhodes
& Brickman, 2010; Kalish & Lawson, 2008), it is important that children are able to
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accurately use these social categories to make inferences. The current experiment is
intended to determine how cross-classification influences children’s inferences.
Specifically, do children privilege certain social roles when making inferences about the
deontic properties of a person that holds multiple, sometimes conflicting, social roles?
Methods
Participants
Participants in this experiment included 35 4- to 5-year-old children (Mage = 4.93,
SD = .50, females = 17) and 35 7- to 8-year-old children (Mage = 8.06, SD = .54, females
= 19). Ninety-one percent of the children in this experiment were Caucasian, 2% were
Asian, and 3% were mixed race (parents of the remaining 4% did not provide a
response). An additional 10 children were interviewed, but their data were excluded
from analyses due to experimenter error (N = 3), parental interference (N = 2), computer
malfunction (N = 2), and inability to follow task instructions (N = 1). Thirty-four of the
participants from Experiment 3 also participated in Experiment 4.
Materials
The materials for this experiment were made up of two sets of three identical line
drawings (see Figure 6). Identical line drawings were used to control for any differences
that may be assumed based on the appearance of the stimuli. These line drawings were
intentionally schematic and lacking detail so that children could not use perceptual
features irrelevant to the task to guide their responses during testing. The gender of the
line drawings was matched to the item type (e.g., female for mom and daughter, male for
dad and son). All images were presented on a laptop, using presentation software.
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Figure 6. Example of stimuli shown to participants in Experiment 3.

Participants were asked to make inferences for two pairs of social roles, mom vs.
daughter and dad vs. son, for a total of 6 items (see Appendix C). For both pairs of social
roles, each social role was presented singly and cross-classified (e.g., mom, daughter,
mom-daughter). Inferences about deontic properties were examined by asking about
whether people “have to listen” to a given individual. Trials were blocked so that
participants always made their inferences about both singly classified individuals in a pair
before making inferences about the cross-classified individual. The order of the blocking
was counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure
The experimenter and the child sat side-by-side at a table with a laptop in front of
them. Participants heard the following directions; “Today I am going to ask you some
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different questions. You can tell me, in your own words, what you think the answer is.”
For the test items, participants were shown an image and given social role information
about the individual presented on the screen. While the experimenter gave the participant
information, she pointed to the image of the person being referenced. For example, items
were presented as follows; “This person is a mom (experimenter pointed to line drawing
on screen). Do people have to listen to her?” This procedure was the same for both pairs
of social roles, except that the pronoun matched the role of the line drawing in the image.
Participants then responded verbally. Participant responses were recorded, transcribed,
and then coded by two independent coders.
Results
Two independent coders coded children’s responses and any disagreement was
solved by a third independent coder. Coders agreed on 414/420 responses, κ = .97, 95%
CI (0.52, 1.42). Participants’ responses to the question of whether they had to listen to a
given individual were coded into three primary categories: (a) yes responses, (b) no
responses, and (c) unsure responses (e.g., ‘I don’t know,’ ‘maybe,’ ‘sometimes;’ see
Table 5).

53

54

Fisher’s exact tests indicated that participants responses on the daughter, 2(2, N
= 70) = 15.27, p < .05, mom-daughter, 2(2, N = 70) = 5.89, p = .05, son, 2(2, N = 70) =
19.65, p < .05, and dad-son 2(2, N = 70) = 7.76, p < .05, items were significantly related
to age group (see Figure 7). There was no significant relationship between responses and
age group for the mom, 2(2, N = 70) = 1.93, p = .743, and dad, 2(2, N = 70) = 3.28, p =
.242, items.
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Figure 7. Percentage of responses by Age Group and Item Type.

Discussion
The goal of this experiment was to examine which social roles children make use
of when making inferences about deontic properties. Specifically, we were interested in
which social roles children would use to make inferences when social roles crossed
hierarchical boundaries. Based on children’s reluctance to cross-classify individuals in
Experiment 1, it seemed likely that the subordinate hierarchical role (e.g., son) would
undermine the inductive potential of the dominant role (e.g., dad). Indeed, in the current
experiment we found that there were different response patterns between age groups for
the different social roles being probed.
Children’s responses to the mom and dad items were the most straightforward,
indicating that across both age groups, the majority of both younger and older children
believed that people had to listen to these individuals. However, children’s responses to
both the subordinate and cross-classified individuals was more varied. While the
majority of older children indicated that people did not have to listen to a daughter or son,
younger children’s responses were almost equally distributed between ‘yes’ and ‘no’
responses. Interestingly, on the mom-daughter and dad-son items, the majority of
younger children indicated that people do have to listen to these individuals, while older
children’s responses were distributed between ‘yes’ and ‘unsure’ responses (see Figure
9).
Taken together, these findings suggest a shift in children’s reasoning about the
deontic properties that hierarchical social roles indicate. Indeed, when presented with
cross-classified items (e.g., mom-daughter and dad-son), the majority of younger children
(80%) indicated that people had to listen to these individuals, suggesting that the
57

subordinate role in the pair (e.g., daughter or son) did not dilute to relevant deontic
properties of the dominant role in the pair (e.g., mom or dad). The only items where
younger children showed mixed patterns of responding were on the subordinate social
role items (e.g., daughter or son), where about half of the children indicated that people
had to listen to these individuals (40% and 45.7% respectively) and about half of the
children indicated that people did not need to listen to these individuals (51.4%). The
majority of older children indicated that people did not need to listen individuals who
only held a subordinate role (82.9%). When presented with cross-classified items, older
children also showed a different pattern of responding than the younger children. On
both the mom-daughter and dad-son items, 62.9% of the older children indicated that
people did need to listen to these individuals, and about 30% gave responses indicating
that they were unsure about whether people needed to listen to these individuals. In
contrast, 80% of the younger children indicated that people did need to listen to these
individuals.
These results suggest that there is a shift in the way children make inferences
about cross-classified individuals. Although more younger children were inclined to
believe that people had to listen to any individual who held a dominant role (even if they
also held a subordinate role), they showed more mixed responding to those who held only
subordinate social roles. In contrast, older children showed a clear pattern of responding
when asked about subordinate roles, indicating that people did not have to listen to these
individuals. Thus, older children’s mix of yes and unsure responses on the crossclassified items may indicate that the relative deontic properties of an individual who
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holds a dominant role can be diluted by simultaneously holding a subordinate role within
the familial hierarchical domain.
Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation of the current experiment is that due to the exploratory nature of
this experiment, our questions were necessarily broad. To gather a baseline for how
children reasoned about the deontic properties of cross-classified individuals, we elected
to present them with a general question about whether they had to listen to a given
individual. It is likely the case that children reason differently about whether people have
to listen to certain individuals depending on the situation. It could be the case that
children show more or less inclination to listen to individuals with certain social roles
when the nature of what they are listening to is important (e.g., following directions about
how to play a game versus following directions about how to use household appliances).
In future studies, it will be important to examine how children’s reasoning differs when
making inferences in specific contexts.
Another limitation of the current experiment is that we only included social roles
within a familial hierarchical domain. For the purposes of this exploratory experiment,
we wanted to use social roles that we felt sure the young children in our sample would
have been familiar with. Although there were differences in response patterns between
age groups within familial hierarchical social roles, it would be interesting to see if this
pattern of responses extended to occupational hierarchical social roles and how children’s
responses to such items might differ. Examining how children make inferences about
individuals holding social roles in different domains would be an informative area of
future study.
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CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENT 4 – CHILDREN’S REASONING ABOUT THE TESTIMONY OF
CROSS-CLASSIFIED INDIVIDUALS
Introduction
One area in which understanding of social categories may influence children’s
reasoning is in their trust of informants. Children’s lack of direct access to information
(Harris, 2012) results in much of their knowledge being received from others (Csibra &
Gergely, 2009). When evaluating information from other sources, children consider
various factors. Jaswal and Neely (2006) found that in the absence of any conflicting
information, both 3- and 4-year-olds preferred object labels provided by an adult over
those provided by a child, indicating that preschoolers believe adults are better sources of
information about the names of objects. Children also make use of informant accuracy
and reliability when deciding whom to trust (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini,
Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). In the current experiment, we will employ
methodologies from the selective trust literature to provide converging evidence about
the development of cross-classification in children and how children reason about the
testimony of cross-classified individuals. Specifically, we were interested in whether
presenting a cross-classified individual within a hierarchical category enhances, dilutes,
or has no effect on children’s reasoning about that individual’s knowledge status.
Koenig and Harris (2005) found that when children were presented with
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individuals who were knowledgeable versus ignorant about the names of various objects,
both 3- and 4-year-old children were able to distinguish between the two types of
informants. Further, 4-year-olds endorsed the claims of knowledgeable informants rather
than ignorant informants. In a subsequent study, Koenig and Harris (2005) found that
both 3- and 4-year-old children extended their preferences for knowledgeable informants
beyond the domain that that person had previously given accurate information in.
Similarly, Pasquini and colleagues (2007) also found that 3- and 4-year-old children were
able to identify inaccurate informants and use that information when deciding who to
trust, suggesting that children consider the relative accuracy of an informant when
making decisions about who is a trustworthy source of information. More generally,
Lane, Wellman, and Gelman (2013) found that children as young as 3-years-old endorse
the testimony of informants they believe are smart over those they believe are not smart.
Similar research has also found that children are sensitive to an informant’s area
of expertise when evaluating claims (e.g., Danovitch & Keil, 2004; Lane, Wellman, &
Gelman, 2013; Lutz & Keil, 2002). Lutz and Keil (2002) presented 3-, 4-, and 5-yearolds with informants that had differing areas of expertise (e.g., a doctor and a mechanic)
and asked children which informant they believed would have more information on
varying topics. They found that children of all ages were able to correctly attribute
relevant knowledge to familiar occupations (e.g., a doctor knows more about how to fix
broken bones than a mechanic), suggesting that they recognize that certain individuals
have areas of expertise. Studies have also found that while children may recognize that
informants have different areas of expertise, it may be difficult for them to use this
information when evaluating testimony. Landrum, Mills, and Johnston (2013) examined
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whether children endorse novel object names based on an informant’s expertise and
found that both 4- and 5-year-old children used expertise to choose which informant’s
testimony was accurate. However, children were generally more accurate at attributing
knowledge to an individual than using knowledge evaluations when endorsing an
expert’s claim.
Given that children take into account relevant information, such as expertise and
knowledge (e.g., Lutz & Keil, 2002), accuracy (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005), and age
(Jaswal & Neely, 2006) when choosing who to trust, we were interested in how children
reason about the testimony of individuals who hold multiple social roles. Experiment 4
examines how children reason about the testimony of four pairs of informants: a teacher
vs. a student, a teacher-student vs. a teacher, a teacher-cook vs. a teacher, and a teacherstudent vs. a teacher-cook. For each pair of informants, children heard each informant
name an unknown object inside a box, and then they were asked which informant they
believe named the object correctly. Children were also asked which informant in each
pair was a better teacher as a measure of relative knowledge status.
There are several different effects that cross-classification might have on
children’s selective trust. First, it could be the case that children’s reluctance to classify
an individual as holding multiple social roles within categories with hierarchical structure
may lead them to trust cross-classified informants less than singly classified informants.
In this case, the subordinate role (e.g., student) may dilute the dominant role (e.g.,
teacher). The items that compare the two cross-classified individuals (teacher-cook vs.
teacher-student), provide us with a measure of relative dilution. Since both the
informants in these items hold multiple social roles, participants responses will indicate
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which role dilutes the role of teacher more, the one within the same domain (e.g., student)
or the one within a different domain (e.g., cook). It seems likely that holding a role
subordinate to teacher (e.g., student) would undermine the role of teacher more than
holding an additional unrelated social role (e.g., cook), and thus make the former
informant’s testimony less trustworthy. A second outcome is that having any two social
roles may indicate a wider knowledge base and enhance the role of teacher, thus making
the cross-classified informant’s testimony more trustworthy. However, it is also possible
that this enhancement will only occur when the two social roles are in unrelated domains
(e.g., teacher-cook). A third option is that holding two social roles does not enhance or
dilute the role of teacher either. Children’s reluctance to cross-classify individuals into
hierarchical social roles may make it difficult for them to reason about these individuals,
resulting in random responding.
Methods
Participants
Participants in this experiment included 35 4- to 5-year-old children (Mage = 5.03,
SD = .50, females = 17) and 35 7- to 8-year-old children (Mage = 8.06, SD = .54, females
= 19) experiment. Ninety percent of the children in this experiment were Caucasian, 1%
were African American, and 3% were mixed race (parents of the remaining 6% did not
provide a response). An additional 6 children were interviewed, but their data were
excluded from analyses due to computer malfunction (N = 2), and inability to follow task
instructions (N = 4). Thirty-four of the participants from Experiment 4 also participated
in Experiment 3.
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Materials
The materials for this experiment included twelve video clips of women naming a
hidden object. Participants were initially shown a still image of an opaque box and told
that they would be guessing what was inside the box. In each trial, videos of two women
were shown side-by-side with the image of an opaque box in between them (see Figure
8). Four different pairs of informants appeared in the videos, each appearing in three
trials. The four different pairs of informants included a person who was a teacher-student
vs. a teacher, a teacher-cook vs. a teacher, a teacher-student vs. a teacher-cook, and a
teacher vs. a student. Each video depicted two females introducing themselves and then
looking into a box and providing a novel name for the hidden object inside. Novel names
were selected from the Novel Object and Unusual Name Database 2nd Edition (Horst &
Hout, 2014) to ensure that familiarity with labels did not influence children’s responses.
The positioning of informants was counterbalanced across participants so that, for each
pair of informants, both women were shown equally often on either side of the box.
Social roles were also counterbalanced across participants so that each informant
introduced themselves as a one informant in the pair for half the participants and the
other informant in the pair for the other half of the participants to ensure that participants
were not just favoring one of the informants or one of the labels.
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Figure 8. Still image of a test trial presented to children in Experiment 4.

Procedure
The twelve video clips were presented in blocks of three and each block included
three items probing the same pair of social roles. For each test item, participants watched
a video and then answered follow-up questions. In each video clip, participants watched
two informants introduce themselves (e.g., “Hi, I’m a teacher and a student”). For the
first test item in each block participants were asked to identify which person held which
social role (e.g., “Can you point to the person who is both a teacher and a student?”).
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These questions were included as a check to make sure that participants remembered
which informant held which social role(s). Participants then began the test trials for each
block. Each test trial included a video of two informants naming the item inside the box.
For example, one of the women in the video said, “There’s a flurp in the box,” and the
other woman said, “There’s a naze in the box.” Participants were then asked to point to
the person who got it right. The procedure was the same for all twelve test items, with
the first item in each block including check questions about which informant held which
social role. At the end of each block, participants were asked, “Is one of these people a
better teacher or are they the same?” If participants responded that one of the informants
was a better teacher there was a follow-up question probing whether they believed that
individual was a little bit better or a lot better. See Appendix D for example protocol.
Results
Testimony Data
Scores on the testimony trials were calculated as a function of dilution. For the
six items that included one cross-classified informant and one singly classified informant
(e.g., teacher-student vs. teacher; teacher-cook vs. teacher), participants were scored a 1
for responses based on the informant who held only one social role, and a 0 for responses
based on the informant who held two social roles. Higher scores on these items would
reflect endorsing the testimony of the singly classified teacher and lower scores would
reflect endorsing the testimony of the teacher-student or teacher-cook. For the three
items that included both cross-classified informants (e.g., teacher-student vs. teachercook), participants were scored a 1 for responses based on the informant who held
unrelated social roles (e.g., teacher-cook), and a 0 for responses based on the informant
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who held related social roles (e.g., teacher-student). On these items, higher scores would
indicate endorsing the testimony of the teacher-cook informant and lower scores would
indicate endorsing the testimony of the teacher-student informant. For the three items
that included only singly classified informants (e.g., teacher vs. student), participants
were scored a 1 for responses based on the informant who held a dominant role (e.g.,
teacher) and a 0 for responses based on the informant who held a subordinate role (e.g.,
student), so that higher scores would indicate endorsing the teacher’s testimony and
lower scores would indicate endorsing the student’s testimony. Each of the four pairs of
informants yielded a total composite score that could range from 0 to 3.
High composite scores on these items reflect a tendency for children to trust
individuals with a single dominant role over individuals with either a subordinate role or
a cross-classification, and to trust individuals cross-classified with non-hierarchical social
roles over those holding roles that are hierarchically related. Thus, high scores on the
composite generally indicate that cross-classification dilutes trust, especially when the
two roles are hierarchically related. Low scores would indicate that cross-classification
enhances trust, and intermediate scores would indicate that cross-classification does not
strongly influence children’s selective trust in informants (see Table 6).
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Preliminary analyses revealed no significant main effects of order or gender, so
subsequent analyses collapsed across these factors. We used a repeated measures
ANOVA with Age Group (younger children and older children) as a between-subjects
factor and Informant Pair (teacher-student vs. teacher, teacher-cook vs. teacher, teacherstudent vs. teacher-cook, teacher vs. student) as a within-subjects factor. We found no
significant main effect of Age Group, F(1, 68) = .71, p = .401, p2 = .01, or Informant
Pair, F(3, 204) = .75, p = .526, p2 =.01, nor a significant interaction between Age Group
and Informant Pair, F(3, 204) = .91, p < .44, p2 =.01 (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Mean number of responses by Age Group and Informant Pair.

Knowledge Attribution Data
Across all informant pairs, responses indicating that neither informant was a
better teacher (i.e., they were the same) were scored a 0. If participants indicated that one
informant was a better teacher, they were then asked a follow-up question probing
whether they believed that informant was ‘a little bit better’ or ‘a lot better.’ Responses
indicating informants holding the roles teacher (as compared to student, teacher-student,
and teacher-cook) and teacher and cook (as compared to teacher-student) were better
teachers, received positive scores. For example, responses indicating that these
informants were ‘a little bit better’ were scored a 1 and responses indicating that these
informants were ‘a lot better’ were scored a 2. Conversely, responses indicating that the
student, teacher-student, or teacher-cook was a better teacher (as compared to the teacher)
or that the teacher-student was a better teacher (as compared to the teacher-cook), were
scored as negative numbers. So, responses indicating that these informants were ‘a little
bit better’ were scored a -1 and responses indicating that these informants were ‘a lot
better’ were scored a -2.
We conducted planned one-sample t-tests comparing children’s scores for each
informant pair to chance (chance = 0; see Table 7). Within the younger age group,
participants scores were significantly greater than chance on the teacher vs. student trials,
t(34) = 2.98, p < .01, and the teacher-cook vs. teacher trials, t(34) = 2.68, p < .05, but did
not differ from chance on the teacher-student vs. teacher trials, t(34) = 0.0, p = 1.00, or
the teacher-student vs. teacher-cook trials, t(34) = -.18, p = .856 (see Figure 10). Within
the younger age group, on the teacher vs. student trials, 6% of children indicated that the
student was ‘a lot better’ of a teacher, 6% indicated that the student was ‘a little better,’
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46% indicated that the teacher and the student were ‘the same,’ 8% indicated that the
teacher was ‘a little better,’ and 34% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’ On the
teacher-student vs. teacher trials, 11% of children indicated that the teacher-student was
‘a lot better’ of a teacher, 6% indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a little better,’ 66%
indicated that the teacher-student and the teacher were ‘the same,’ 6% indicated that the
teacher was ‘a little better,’ and 11% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’ On the
teacher-cook vs. teacher trials, 8% of children indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a lot
better’ of a teacher, 3% indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a little better,’ 43% indicated
that the teacher-cook and the teacher were ‘the same,’ 17% indicated that the teacher was
‘a little better,’ and 29% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’ On the teacherstudent vs. teacher-cook trials, 11% of children indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a
lot better’ of a teacher, 77% indicated that the teacher-student and the teacher-cook were
‘the same,’ 3% indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a little better,’ and 9% indicated that
the teacher-cook was ‘a lot better.’
Within the older age group, participants’ scores were significantly greater than
chance on the teacher vs. student trials, t(34) = 5.25, p < .001, but did not differ from
chance on the teacher-student vs. teacher trials, t(34) = 1.68, p = .102, teacher-cook vs.
teacher, t(34) = 1.43, p = .163, or teacher-student vs. teacher-cook trials, t(34) = -.725, p
= .473. Within the older age group, on the teacher vs. student trials, 3% of children
indicated that the student was ‘a little better’ of a teacher, 43% indicated that the teacher
and the student were ‘the same,’ 26% indicated that the teacher was ‘a little better,’ and
28% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’ On the teacher-student vs. teacher trials,
6% of children indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a lot better’ of a teacher, 11%
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indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a little better,’ 49% indicated that the teacherstudent and the teacher were ‘the same,’ 14% indicated that the teacher was ‘a little
better,’ and 20% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’ On the teacher-cook vs.
teacher trials, 9% of children indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a lot better’ of a
teacher, 3% indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a little better,’ 60% indicated that the
teacher-cook and the teacher were ‘the same,’ 11% indicated that the teacher was ‘a little
better,’ and 17% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’ On the teacher-student vs.
teacher-cook trials, 11% of children indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a lot better’ of
a teacher, 9% indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a little better,’ 66% indicated that
the teacher-student and the teacher-cook were ‘the same,’ 9% indicated that the teachercook was ‘a little better,’ and 5% indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a lot better.’
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Figure 10. Mean knowledge attribution ratings by Age Group and Informant Pair.

Discussion
The goal of this experiment was to examine whether children’s reliance on
different informants’ testimony differed as a function of the social roles that informants
held. Specifically, we were interested in whether children trusted the testimony of a
cross-classified individual more or less than that of a singly classified individual, and
how children’s testimony evaluations differed based on the structure of the roles the
cross-classified individual held. Many studies have investigated how children evaluate
testimony, and what factors they consider when choosing whose testimony to trust;
however, none have directly investigated whether children privilege certain roles when
evaluating the testimony of individuals who hold multiple social roles. In their daily
lives, children encounter individuals with a range of social roles, many of whom hold
multiple roles within the same domain. Thus, to gather baseline data on how children
evaluate the testimony of cross-classified individuals, we used a selective trust paradigm.
In addition to understanding how children evaluate the testimony of cross-classified
individuals, we were also interested in children’s judgments of these individuals’
knowledge in a given domain.
The results of the current experiment revealed that overall, children did not seem
to privilege certain social roles when evaluating informant’s testimony about an unknown
object. This pattern of results held for both age groups, indicating that age did not play a
role in children’s testimony judgments in the current experiment. However, it seems
unlikely that children would not trust the testimony of a teacher more than that of a
student. Indeed, studies have found that children trust the testimony of informants who
have expertise in a given area (e.g., Danovitch & Keil, 2004; Lane, Wellman, & Gelman,
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2013; Lutz & Keil, 2002). Thus, it may be the case that for novel object naming in
particular, the social roles individuals hold do not influence children’s reasoning.
When children’s evaluations of which informant was a better teacher were
compared to chance, both age group’s scores were significantly greater than chance on
the teacher vs. student items, indicating that they recognized that a teacher has more
relevant expertise in a teaching domain than a student. Additionally, the younger group
of children had scores that were significantly greater than chance on the teacher-cook vs.
teacher items, indicating that they believed a singly classified teacher had more expertise
than a teacher that held multiple roles in different domains (e.g., cook). These results
suggest that the subordinate role of student did not enhance or dilute the dominant role of
teacher, and thus did not negatively affect children’s knowledge judgements. Similar to
previous findings, it may be the case that while children are able to attribute knowledge
to an individual, they exhibit more difficulty with using knowledge attributions when
evaluating testimony (Landrum et al., 2013).
Limitations and Future Directions
In the current experiment, we aimed to examine how children reasoned about the
testimony of cross-classified individuals. As a first step, we chose to use a novel object
naming paradigm to see if any differences appeared in the absence of other contextual
factors. One limitation of the current experiment may be that this paradigm did not
reflect children’s real-world interactions. It could be the case that children do in fact
evaluate the testimony of cross-classified individuals differently, but only in certain
situations. For example, being a teacher and a student may not indicate that you know
what is inside a box, but being a teacher and a student may indicate that you know more
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or less about classroom rules. In future studies, it will be beneficial to see how children
reason about testimony from cross-classified individuals across a variety of contexts.
Additionally, in the current experiment we elected to use only occupation
hierarchical roles. However, Experiment 1 indicated that both younger and older children
are less willing to cross-classify individuals as holding multiple social roles in a familial
hierarchical domain. Similarly, in Experiment 3, children showed different response
patterns across age groups in their reasoning about whether or not people had to listen to
cross-classified individuals within a familial hierarchical domain. Thus, in future studies
it will be important to investigate how children reason about the testimony of individuals
who hold multiple roles in a familial hierarchical domain and how this may differ from
their reasoning about individuals in an occupation hierarchical domain.
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CHAPTER VII
GENERAL DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
The goal of these four experiments was to examine the development of children’s
willingness to cross-classify individuals across different social categories, and to
investigate how children reason about cross-classified individuals. Cross-classification is
an important aspect of social cognition as almost everyone a child interacts with holds
multiple social roles. Thus, to interact with others both appropriately and effectively,
children must be able to consider the many social roles that individuals hold. These
experiments answered two broad questions: 1) how does children’s willingness to crossclassify individuals develop?, and 2) how does cross-classification influence children’s
reasoning in different domains?
Children’s Cross-classification Behaviors
In terms of how children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals develops,
Experiments 1 and 2 illustrated that children become more willing to cross-classify
individuals over time. Experiment 1 indicated that there are developmental differences in
children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals, and that these differences vary based
on the structure of the social category in question. Although the younger children in
Experiment 1 were the least willing to cross-classify individuals across social categories,
older children were only unwilling to do so when presented with social roles with
hierarchical structure (e.g., teacher-student, mom-daughter). Although there was a
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developmental shift in younger and older children’s willingness to cross-classify
individuals, older children still did not exhibit adult-like cross-classification across all
social categories. The older children in Experiment 1 seemed to represent a
developmental midpoint between younger children and adults, demonstrating some
willingness to classify individuals as holding multiple social roles, but only when these
roles did not have a hierarchical structure.
Experiment 2 demonstrated that when provided with scaffolding in the form of a
verbal and visual reminder of hierarchical family structure, younger children showed no
differences in willingness to cross-classify individuals across hierarchical versus nonhierarchical social roles. The older children tested in this experiment showed an
increased willingness to cross-classify individuals in the familial hierarchical and
occupation non-hierarchical roles as compared to the occupation hierarchical roles.
Additionally, both age groups cross-classified at levels significantly above chance for all
social categories. Experiment 2 also indicated that children’s cross-classification
behaviors were not predicted by cognitive flexibility, nonverbal reasoning, or age.
However, it is also possible that the variables we investigated in Experiment 2 do account
for some of the differences in children’s cross-classification behaviors, but because the
scaffolding we provided resulted in younger children cross-classifying at similar rates to
older children (thus reducing the overall amount of variability in their data), these
differences were no longer measurable.
Although studies have found that young children are able to cross-classify entities
such as objects and food (e.g., Nguyen, 2007; Nguyen & Murphy, 2003), the results of
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that cross-classification may be more difficult within the
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social domain. However, providing young children with scaffolding increased their
willingness to cross-classify individuals within familial hierarchical social roles. Thus, it
may be the case that while reasoning that individuals hold multiple social roles is too
representationally complex for young children, reducing their cognitive load can address
this complexity and increase the rate at which they are willing to cross-classify
individuals.
However, there could also be more specific cognitive limitations that account for
children’s difficulties with cross-classification within a social domain. Children’s
reluctance to cross-classify individuals may stem from a mutual exclusivity bias
(Markman, 1989; Merriman & Bowman, 1989; Woodward & Markman, 1991).
Although this bias may be adaptive for word learning, it may also negatively impact
children’s ability to perform cross-classification. However, the literature on the mutual
exclusivity bias is conflicting, with some studies suggesting that children as young as two
will accept multiple labels for the same objects (e.g., Clark & Svaib, 1997; Deak &
Maratsos, 1998; Mervis, Golinkoff, & Bertrand, 1994). Although studies have indicated
that children will cross-classify objects, children may be more stringent when crossclassifying people because the roles people hold determine how children should behave
or interact with them (Kalish & Lawson, 2008; Rhodes, 2013). It could be the case that
children are more conservative about cross-classifying individuals at a young age because
they believe social categories are more mutually exclusive than non-social categories.
It is also possible that there are other cognitive mechanisms that underlie
children’s cross-classification of individuals. One possibility is that there is a
relationship between children’s theory of mind and their willingness to cross-classify
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individuals. It could be the case that to classify an individual as holding multiple social
roles, children need to be able to shift their view from one perspective of an individual
(e.g., teacher) to another perspective (e.g., student). Another possibility is that there is a
relation between inhibitory control and children’s beliefs that individuals can be crossclassified. It is possible that once children accept a label for an individual (e.g., ‘This
person is a teacher’), they are unable to inhibit that response when asked to accept a
second label for the same individual. Experiment 1 suggests that accepting multiple roles
may be even more difficult for children when they are reasoning about hierarchically
structured social roles. The results of these two experiments suggest that willingness to
cross-classify individuals is still developing over the preschool and early elementary
years. In future studies it will be important to explore these other cognitive competencies
to discover what variables predict the development of children’s cross-classification
behaviors in a social domain.
Finally, in these exploratory experiments, we chose to include eight-year-old
children because we felt this older age group would allow us to capture changes in
reasoning between younger children and adults. Although we discovered clear
developmental differences between younger participants and adults in Experiment 1, the
older children in this experiment did not exhibit adult-like reasoning when presented with
hierarchically structured categories. In future studies of this nature, it would be
beneficial to include even older children to determine when adult-like reasoning about
hierarchically structured social roles occurs.
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Children’s Reasoning about Cross-classified Individuals
The second question these experiments answered was how cross-classification
influences children’s reasoning in different domains. In these experiments we were
specifically interested in how children made inferences about and evaluated the testimony
of cross-classified individuals. Experiment 3 demonstrated that there are different
developmental patterns in the children’s inferences about the deontic properties of singly
versus cross-classified individuals. Most of the younger and older children indicated that
they believed people did need to listen to individuals who hold only a dominant social
role (e.g., a mom or a dad). Children showed different patterns of responding for
individuals who held only a subordinate role (e.g., a daughter or a son), with the majority
of older children indicating that it is not necessary to listen to these individuals, and
younger children showing a more distributed pattern of responses between needing
versus not needing to listen to these individuals. However, the opposite pattern emerged
for the cross-classified items (e.g., a mom-daughter or a dad-son), in that the majority of
younger children indicated that you do need to listen to these individuals, while older
children’s responses were more mixed, sometimes indicating that people did need to
listen to these individuals and sometimes indicating that they were unsure about whether
people needed to listen to these individuals.
These results suggest that younger children may make more use of inductive
selectivity (i.e., using individual category membership to make inferences about crossclassified items; Nguyen & Girgis, 2014) than older children when reasoning about crossclassified individuals, as evidenced by their inclination to believe that people should
listen to individuals who hold dominant roles (even if they also hold subordinate roles).
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In contrast, the distribution of older children’s responses when reasoning about whether
people needed to listen to cross-classified individuals implies that they were not simply
using one known social role (e.g., mom or daughter) to make inferences about deontic
properties but that some children may have tried to account for both social roles (e.g.,
mom and daughter) when making these inferences. Although research has found that
adults tend to rely on the most distinctive social role when making inferences about
multiply classified individuals (Macrae et al., 1995; Nelson & Miller, 1995), children
may not do so in the early elementary years. The results of Experiment 3, in addition to
previous research with adults (Nelson & Miller, 1995; Macrae et al., 1995; Murphy &
Ross, 1999), suggest that the use of inductive selectivity when making inferences about
cross-classified individuals may follow a U-shaped developmental curve. Although
preschool age children and adults tend to base their inferences off one distinctive social
role, older children may attempt to make use of both social roles when making inferences
about cross-classified individuals. Although studies have found that children as young as
four demonstrate inductive selectivity when making inferences about objects and food
(Kalish & Gelman, 1992; Nguyen, 2012; Nguyen & Murphy, 2003), the responses of
older children in Experiment 3 suggest that their intuitions may still be developing in the
social domain. However, it could be that children, like adults (Murphy & Ross, 1999),
will demonstrate inductive selectivity when making inferences if one social role is made
contextually salient. In future studies it will be important to investigate how context
influences children’s inferences about cross-classified individuals.
Experiment 4 indicated that overall children were not privileging certain social
roles when evaluating cross-classified individuals’ testimony about the name of a hidden
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object. However, Experiment 4 did demonstrate that having a subordinate role (e.g.,
student) within the same domain as a dominate role (e.g., teacher) did not enhance or
dilute the knowledge status (in this case, who was a better teacher) of these individuals.
Additionally, both younger and older children in this study indicated that they believed a
singly classified teacher was a better teacher than a singly classified student. Younger
children also indicated that they believed a singly classified teacher had greater expertise
than a cross-classified teacher-cook, suggesting that when a second social role is held in
an unrelated domain, it may dilute the perceived knowledge of the relevant or dominant
role. The overall results of Experiment 4 indicated that children may be better at
attributing knowledge to an individual than using this information to evaluate their
testimony (e.g., as in Landrum et al., 2013).
Given that this experiment was the first step in investigating children’s trust in
cross-classified informants, we were interested in how testimony was evaluated based
solely on the social roles that an informant held. Thus, we elected to employ an object
naming selective trust paradigm, to remove any contextual factors that children may have
used to make testimony evaluations. Although we found that children did not privilege
certain social roles (e.g., teacher) when evaluating informant’s testimony, it seems
unlikely that this is the case in children’s real-world behaviors. Indeed, teachers are often
a source of knowledge for children. Additionally, previous research suggests that
children prefer informants who are accurate and reliable over those that are not (Koenig
& Harris, 2005; Pasquini et al., 2007). It could be the case that children do in fact rely on
a given individual’s social roles when evaluating their testimony, but that doing so
depends on the context of that testimony. For example, teachers may know more than
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students about classroom rules or what to do during a fire drill, but this may not be the
case for knowing the name of an object. In future studies it will be important to examine
how children make use of social roles when evaluating testimony in different contexts.
Conclusions
Overall, the findings of these four experiments illustrate that there are
developmental differences in willingness to cross-classify individuals and reasoning
about cross-classified individuals, between the preschool, early elementary, and adult
years. Social roles provide information about the traits and behaviors of others (Baron et
al., 2014), what people may be obligated or not allowed to do (Kalish & Lawson, 2008),
and how others should behave in relation to certain individuals (Watson, 1984). The
results of these experiments suggest that cross-classification may influence the way
children make inferences about individuals, but that cross-classification does not
influence testimony evaluations when social roles are not contextually salient. Although
these experiments indicate that children are reluctant to cross-classify individuals within
hierarchical domains, they also highlight the importance of examining the influence this
reluctance may have in more real-world scenarios. Because social roles represent such a
great deal of information relevant to social interactions, it could be the case that it takes
more time and experience for children to develop adult-like cross-classification and
reasoning in the social domain than it does in non-social domains. Future research
should continue to explore the development of children’s cross-classification behaviors in
a social domain, as well as investigate how children’s intuitions about cross-classification
influences their interactions with and reasoning about others.
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Appendix A
Today I’m going to show you pictures of people and tell you different things about them.
I want you to listen very carefully because I am going to ask you questions about these
people, okay?
12.This person is nice. Can this person also be mean?
Yes
No
15.This person is a runner. Can this person also be a cook?
Yes
No
14.This person is a student. Can this person also be a teacher?
Yes
No
9.This person is a son. Can this person also be a dad?
Yes
No
19.This is a person. Can this person also be a kangaroo?
Yes
No
5.This person is strong. Can this person also be weak?
Yes
No
10.This person is a swimmer. Can this person also be an artist?
Yes
No
16.This person is a dad. Can this person also be a son?
Yes
No
18.This person is poor. Can this person also be rich?
Yes
No
24.This person is mean. Can this person also be nice?
Yes
No
8.This person is a patient. Can this person also be a doctor?
Yes
No
1.This is a person. Can this person also be a giraffe?
Yes
No
4.This person is a mom. Can this person also be a daughter?
Yes
No
3.This person is a cook. Can this person also be a runner?
Yes
No
7.This is a person. Can this person also be a dolphin?
Yes
No
11.This person is short. Can this person also be tall?
Yes
No
21.This person is a daughter. Can this person also be a mom?
Yes
No
6.This person is rich. Can this person also be poor?
Yes
No
2.This person is a teacher. Can this person also be a student?
Yes
No
17.This person is weak. Can this person also be strong?
Yes
No
13.This is a person. Can this person also be a horse?
Yes
No
20.This person is a doctor. Can this person also be a patient?
Yes
No
22.This person is an artist. Can this person also be a swimmer?
Yes
No
23.This person is tall. Can this person also be short?
Yes
No
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Appendix B
(Family tree schematic on table) First I want to tell you about this picture. (Put circle on
daughter/son) This person is her/his daughter/son (point to mom/dad). (Put circle on
mom/dad) This person is her/his (point to daughter/son) mom/dad. She/he (keep circle on
mom/dad) is also this persons (point to grandma/grandpa) daughter/son. (Put circle on
grandma/grandpa) This person is her/his (point to mom/dad) mom/dad.
Now I’m going to show you pictures of people and tell you different things about them. I
want you to listen very carefully because I am going to ask you questions about these
people, okay?
1.This person is a runner. Can this person also be a cook?
Yes
No
5.This person is a dad. Can this person also be a son?
Yes
No
7.This person is a mom. Can this person also be a daughter?
Yes
No
2.This person is a student. Can this person also be a teacher?
Yes
No
9.This person is a daughter. Can this person also be a mom?
Yes
No
6.This person is a patient. Can this person also be a doctor?
Yes
No
4.This person is a swimmer. Can this person also be an artist?
Yes
No
3.This person is a son. Can this person also be a dad?
Yes
No
10.This person is a teacher. Can this person also be a student?
Yes
No
8.This person is a cook. Can this person also be a runner?
Yes
No
11.This person is a doctor. Can this person also be a patient?
Yes
No
12.This person is an artist. Can this person also be a swimmer?
Yes
No
TOTAL: .
Now I need your help matching some words with pictures.
Student. Can you point to the picture of a student?
Teacher

Student

Doctor

Patient

Chef

Doctor. Can you point to the picture of a doctor?
Teacher

Student

Doctor

Patient

Chef

Patient. Can you point to the picture of a patient?
Teacher

Student

Doctor

Patient
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Chef

/12

Teacher. Can you point to the picture of a teacher?
Teacher

Student

Doctor

Patient

Chef

Card Sort Task
Place the two sorting trays side by side in front of the subject within reaching
distance (i.e., blue rabbit in the tray to the child’s left and red boat in the tray to the
child’s right).
1.
Demonstration Phase
SAY, “Here’s a blue rabbit and here’s a red boat. Now, we’re going to play a card
game. This is the color game. In the color game, all the blue ones go here [pointing to
the tray on the left], and all the red ones go there [pointing to the tray on the right].”
Take first Demo Card and SAY, “See, here’s a blue one. So it goes here [place it face
down in the correct tray].”
REPEAT, “If it’s blue it goes here, but if it’s red it goes there.” Show children the
other Demo Card and SAY, “Now here’s a red one. Where does this one go?”
**If the child takes the card and sorts it correctly or simply indicates the
correct tray by pointing, say, “Very good. You know how to play the color game.”
If they point, say, “Can you help me put this red one down?” Ensure that the
card is placed face-down in the appropriate tray, turning the card over if
necessary.
**If the child sorts incorrectly, say, “No, this one’s red, so it has to go over here
in the color game. Can you help me put this red one down?” Ensure that the card
is placed face-down in the appropriate tray.
2. Pre-Switch Phase
Proceed immediately to the pre-switch phase. On the first pre-switch trial, SAY,
“Now it’s your turn. So remember, if it’s blue it goes here, but if it’s red it goes there.”
Select the first test card, the blue boat with #1 labeled on the back. SAY, “This one
is (*color of card), where does it go?” The child may take the card and place it in a
tray or simply point to one of the trays, in which case, you may sort the card for
them. Always ensure that the card is placed face down in the appropriate tray.
Whether or not children sort correctly, SAY, “Let’s do another one, this card is
(*color of card), where does it go?”
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Pre-Switch/Color Trial
Item

Card

Answer

1

Blue Boat

Blue (Tray 1)

2

Red Rabbit

Red (Tray 2)

3

Red Rabbit

Red (Tray 2)

4

Blue Boat

Blue (Tray 1)

5

Red Rabbit

Red (Tray 2)

6

Blue Boat

Blue (Tray 1)

Correct=1;
Incorrect=0

3. Post-Switch Phase
After six pre-switch trials, SAY, “Now we’re going to play a new game. We’re not
going to play the color game anymore. We’re going to play the shape game. In the shape
game, all the rabbits go here [pointing to the tray on the left], and all the boats go there
[pointing to the tray on the right]. Remember, if it’s a rabbit, put it here, but if it’s a
boat put it there. Okay?”
Do not remove the target cards or the cards that were sorted during the pre-switch
phase, and do not pause between pre- and postswitch phases.
Select the seventh test card, the red rabbit with #7 labeled on the back. Say, “Where
does it go?” Whether or not the child sorts correctly, SAY, “Let’s do another one,
where does this one go?”
Post-Switch/Shape Trial
Item

Card

Answer

7

Red Rabbit

Rabbit (Tray 1)

8

Blue Boat

Boat (Tray 2)

9

Red Rabbit

Rabbit (Tray 1)

10

Red Rabbit

Rabbit (Tray 1)

11

Blue Boat

Boat (Tray 2)

12

Blue Boat

Boat (Tray 2)

Pre/Post Combined Total Correct: ___________
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Correct=1; Incorrect=0

** Children must get at least 5 correct on Post-Switch Trial to proceed to Border
Version
4. Border Phase
If the child gets at least 5 out of the 6 post-switch trials correct they can move on to
the border phase. However, if the child gets less than 5 correct on the post-switch
trial they are done with the Card Sort Task and do not qualify for the border trial.
If the child qualifies for the border trials, say, “Okay, you played really well. Now I
have a more difficult game for you to play. In this game, you sometimes get cards that
have a black border around it like this one [showing a red rabbit with a border]. If you
see cards with a black border, you have to play the color game. In the color game, red
ones go here and blue ones go there [pointing to the appropriate trays].
Take a red rabbit with a border demo card and say, “This card’s red, so I’m going to
put it right there [placing it face down in the appropriate tray]. But if the cards have
no black border, like this one [show them the red rabbit without a border demo card],
you have to play the shape game. In the shape game, if it’s a rabbit, we put it here, but if
it’s a boat, we put it there [pointing to the appropriate trays].This one’s a rabbit, so
I’m going to put it right here [placing it face down in the appropriate tray]. Okay?
Now it’s your turn.”
Say “Remember, if there is a black border then you play the color game. If there is no
black border then you play the shape game.” Select the first border trial card, blue
boat with a border that is labeled #13 on the back. “This one has (or doesn’t have) a
border. Where does it go?”
For remaining cards, say, “This one has (or doesn’t have) a border. Where does it go?”
Border Trial
Item

Card

Answer

13

Blue Boat w/ Border

Blue (Tray 1)

14

Red Rabbit

Rabbit (Tray 1)

15

Red Rabbit w/ Border

Red (Tray 2)

16

Blue Boat

Boat (Tray 2)

17

Red Rabbit

Rabbit (Tray 1)

18

Blue Boat w/ Border

Blue (Tray 1)

19

Red Rabbit w/ Border

Red (Tray 2)

20

Blue Boat

Boat (Tray 2)
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Correct=1; Incorrect=0

21

Blue Boat w/ Border

Blue (Tray 1)

22

Red Rabbit

Rabbit (Tray 1)

23

Blue Boat

Boat (Tray 2)

24

Red Rabbit w/ Border

Red (Tray 2)

Border Version Total Correct: ___________
GRAND TOTAL CORRECT: __________
(Note: Add total correct from Color, Shape, and Border trials)
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Appendix C
Today I am going to ask you some different questions. You can tell me in your own
words what you think the answer is.
1. This person is a mom. Do people have to listen to her?
.
.
.
.
2. This person is a daughter. Do people have to listen to her?
.
.
.
.
3. This person is a mom and a daughter. Do people have to listen to her?
.
.
.
.
4. This person is a dad. Do people have to listen to him?
.
.
.
.
5. This person is a son. Do people have to listen to him?
.
.
.
.
6. This person is a dad and a son. Do people have to listen to him?
.
.
.
.
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Appendix D
(Start on slide 1 with image of only the box) Today I need your help answering some
questions. I want to find out what is in this box (point to box on screen), so I asked some
people I know. They made videos to tell me what they think is in the box. It is your job to
tell me who got it right.
TeacherStudent vs. TeacherCook
TSvsTC1. [Slide 2, play video]
TSvsTC1check1. Can you point to which person is both a Teacher and a Cook? (If
child answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and
saying, “Actually this person is both a teacher and a cook” and repeat the original
question)
TeacherCook

TeacherStudent

# of times repeated for
accurate answer

TSvsTC1check2. Can you point to which person is both a Teacher and a Student?
(If child answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and
saying, “Actually this person is both a teacher and a student” and repeat the
original question)
TeacherCook

TeacherStudent

# of times repeated for
accurate answer

TSvsTC3. [Slide 2] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Cook (point to
TeacherCook) said there is a ‘vab’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher and a
Student (point to TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘dax’ in the box. Can you point to the
person who got it right?
TeacherCook

TeacherStudent

TSvsTC2. [Slide 3, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Student
(point to TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘stid’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher
and Cook (point to TeacherCook) said there is a ‘gaz’ in the box. Can you point to the
person who got it right?
TeacherStudent

TeacherCook

TSvsTC1. [Slide 4, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Cook (point
to TeacherCook) said there is a ‘kiv’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher and a
Student (point to TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘hux’ in the box. Can you point to the
person who got it right?
TeacherCook

TeacherStudent

TSvsTCcomparison. [Stay on Slide 4 screen] Is one of these people a better teacher or are
they the same? (if they say one of them is better, circle answer and move on to follow-up)
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TeacherCook

Same

TeacherStudent

TSvsTCfollow-up. Are they a little bit better or a lot better?
Little bit better

A lot better

TeacherCook vs. Teacher
TCvsT1. [Slide 5, play video]
TCvsT1check1. Can you point to which person is only a Teacher? (If child
answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and saying,
“Actually this person is only a teacher” and repeat the original question)
Teacher

TeacherCook

# of times repeated for
accurate answer

TCvsT1check2. Can you point to which person is both a Teacher and a Cook? (If
child answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and
saying, “Actually this person is both a teacher and a cook” and repeat the original
question)
Teacher

TeacherCook

# of times repeated for
accurate answer

TCvsT3. [Slide 5] Remember the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher) said there is
a ‘kark’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher and a Cook (point to TeacherCook)
said there is a ‘lep’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it right?
Teacher

TeacherCook

TCvsT2. [Slide 6, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Cook (point
to TeacherCook) said there is a ‘lorp’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher (point
to Teacher) said there is a ‘wost’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it right?
TeacherCook

Teacher

TCvsT1. [Slide 7, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher)
said there is a ‘zog’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher and a Cook (point to
TeacherCook) said there is a ‘goeb’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it
right?
Teacher

TeacherCook

TCvsTcomparison. [Stay on Slide 7 screen] Is one of these people a better teacher or are
they the same? (if they say one of them is better, circle answer and move on to follow-up)
Teacher

Same

TeacherCook

TCvsTfollow-up. Are they a little bit better or a lot better?
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Little bit better

A lot better

TeacherStudent vs. Teacher
TSvsT1. [Slide 8, play video]
TSvsT1check1. Can you point to which person is both a Teacher and a Student? (If
child answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and
saying, “Actually this person is both a teacher and a student” and repeat the
original question)
TeacherStudent

Teacher

# of times repeated for
accurate answer

TSvsT1check2. Can you point to which person is only a Teacher? (If child
answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and saying,
“Actually this person is only a teacher” and repeat the original question)
TeacherStudent

Teacher

# of times repeated for
accurate answer

TSvsT3. [Slide 8] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Student (point to
TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘zorb’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher (point
to Teacher) said there is a ‘husp’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it right?
TeacherStudent

Teacher

TSvsT2. [Slide 9, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher)
said there is a ‘naze’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher and a Student (point to
TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘flurp’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it
right?
Teacher

TeacherStudent

TSvsT1. [Slide 10, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Student
(point to TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘roak’ in the box and the person who is a
Teacher (point to Teacher) said there is a ‘jate’ in the box. Can you point to the person
who got it right?
TeacherStudent

Teacher

TSvsTcomparison. [Stay on Slide 10 screen] Is one of these people a better teacher or are
they the same? (if they say one of them is better, circle answer and move on to follow-up)
TeacherStudent

Same

Teacher

TSvsTfollow-up. Are they a little bit better or a lot better?
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Little bit better

A lot better

Teacher vs. Student
TvsS1. [Slide 11, play videos]
TvsS1check1. Can you point to which person is a Teacher? (If child answers
incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and saying, “Actually
this person is a Teacher” and repeat the original question)
Teacher

Student

# of times repeated for
accurate answer

TvsS1check2. Can you point to which person is a Student? (If child answers
incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and saying, “Actually
this person is a Student” and repeat the original question)
Teacher

Student

# of times repeated for
accurate answer

TvsS3. [Slide 11] Remember the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher) said there is
a ‘rel’ in the box and the person who is a Student (point to Student) said there is a ‘tust’ in
the box. Can you point to the person who got it right?
Teacher

Student

TvsS2. [Slide 12, play video] Remember the person who is a Student (point to Student)
said there is a ‘wilp’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher) said
there is a ‘deld’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it right?
Student

Teacher

TvsS1. [Slide 13, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher)
said there is a ‘cheem’ in the box and the person who is a Student (point to Student) said
there is a ‘sarl’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it right?
Teacher

Student

TvsScomparison. [Stay on Slide 13 screen] Is one of these people a better teacher or are
they the same? (if they say one of them is better, circle answer and move on to follow-up)
Teacher

Same

Student

TvsSfollow-up. Are they a little bit better or a lot better?
Little bit better
A lot better
We’re all done, thanks for helping me today!
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